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Vast revenues coming from mineral resources encourage rent-seeking activities 
that ham-per institutions and development. This phenomenon is captured in 
the ‘resource curse’ theory, meaning that mineral-rich countries perform worse 
in economic growth. Thus, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), launched in 2002, was presented as an alternative to counter corruption 
through the disclosure of information and the involvement of different 
stakeholders in the extractive sector. Since then, the number of new EITI 
members increased progressively, as well as the studies to assess the initiative’s 
validity. There are several evaluations performed on the whole sample of EITI 
countries and few on individual case studies. However, there remains scarce 
evidence of analyses on individual cases within the same region. In this regard, 
this study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to measure the EITI’s 
impact on corruption in five Latin American countries: Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The method allows for seeing the 
EITI’s effect in each stage of its implementation. The results of this research 
are mixed. In most cases, there is not a decrease in corruption. Instead, there is 
a marginal increase in corruption. Several reasons could explain these findings, 
such as political scandals of corruption, civil conflicts, or weak involvement of 
the civil society. Hence, the latter explanations would suggest that the EITI in 
Latin America has been unsuccessful. This evidence improves our 
comprehension of the evolution of corruption in developing countries after an 
intervention of this nature.  
Keywords 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI, Corruption, Transparency, 
Governance, Resource Curse, Synthetic Control Methodology. 
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Does the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) help reduce corruption in Latin 
America?  
Evidence from Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and 
Trinidad and Tobago 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and relevance of the proposed research 
Corruption is a social phenomenon defined in general terms as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 2019). This 
problem of historical, structural and systemic nature has especially been 
perpetuated over time in developing countries, such as those of Latin America. 
Warf and Stewart (2016) mention that the colonial period defined the way that 
institutions work in Latin America. The colonizers of these countries created 
stratified societies and an extensive extractive model linked to the colonial rule. 
These factors made these countries dependent on their conquerors and a 
system of exchange of economic and political rights for loyalty. The result was 
a limited development of institutions that did not guarantee the rights of the 
whole population. The latter situation —the lack of independent legal 
institutions and the fragile rule of law— gave rise to clientelism and illicit 
economic activities, committed mostly by the disadvantaged mestizos1. In this 
sense, Latin American countries, mainly colonized by Spain and Portugal, 
inherited a favorable environment for rent-seeking practices. The colonial 
journey that has led to persistent corruption in Latin America is distinguished 
from other parts of the world. For instance, Africa was colonized by different 
powers and obtained independence almost one century later than Latin 
America (Warf and Stewart 2016). Thereby, Latin America has dealt with 
corrupt practices for such a long time that people have internalized them as 
part of their daily lives, even though they catalog corruption as undesirable and 
problematic. Hence, corruption is so deeply embedded in the daily language 
that people tend to agree with the phrase, “They are corrupt, but at least they 
work” (La Vanguardia 2018).    
 
1 The rent-seeking environment was consolidated later with the independence of Latin 
American countries and the unstable political order. In that period the new 
independent states lost their third-party enforcement of rights which caused turmoil 
and violence, like the civil war in Mexico in 1810. Likewise, these new states did not 
even have well-defined borders, which provoked external conflicts with huge 
expenditures, around 77 percent of their budgets, see more in Prados De La Escosura 
(2005) and Bates et al. (2007). Afterward, this region experienced similar political 
regimes in analogous periods, from dictatorships, autocracies to populist right-wing 
governments (Rothstein and Uslaner 2012). 
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Corruption in different forms costs the states millions of dollars every 
year. According to the organization Global Financial Integrity (2015), Latin 
America annually lost about 3% of its GDP in illicit financial outflows between 
2003 and 2012 (Vogl 2015). The main problems linked to corruption in the 
region involve money laundering in the Caribbean, drug cultivation and 
trafficking in the Andes, organized crime in Central America, financial 
irregularities in Brazil, and weak legal framework in Haiti (La Vanguardia 
2018). Moreover, according to the Centro Estratégico Latinoamericano de 
Geopolítica (CELAG, Latin American Strategic Center of Geopolitics) (2018), 
corruption in Latin America is present in the forms of sending money to tax 
havens for tax evasion, using of public resources for private ends, capital 
outflows, bribery networks — from low ranking officials to presidents, and 
plundering of natural resources. This Strategic Center adds that those that have 
benefited from corruption and the flaws of ‘third world culture’ are the big 
businessmen.   
The social perceptions about corruption are comparable among Latin 
American countries. Figure 1 illustrates worldwide the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) from Transparency International in 2018, being the ‘dark orange’ 
color the representation of most corrupt countries. Regarding this index, Latin 
America obtained, on average, 38 over 100 points (0 being the most corrupt 
and 100 the least corrupt). This is excepting Chile, Barbados, and Uruguay that 
perform better with 67, 68, and 70 points respectively. This region has lower 
levels of corruption compared, for example, to Sub-Saharan Africa’s CPI of 32 
over 100. Besides that, in 18 countries of Latin America, corruption is 
perceived as the third most important issue along with the ‘political situation’. 
The first and second problems are the ‘economic situation’ and ‘delinquency’ 
correspondingly. In the specific cases of Colombia, Peru, and Brazil, 
corruption is ranked as the first concern (Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2018). 
Figure 1 
Corruption Perception Index Map 2018 
 
 






Furthermore, common cases of corruption have been found that involve two 
or more countries from the region. One noticeable case was that of 
Odebrecht2 that bribed and financed political campaigns in 12 Latin American 
countries, diverting millions of dollars through sophisticated payments. As a 
consequence, there are politicians in jail, hundreds of people have lost their 
jobs, and many corrupt people have received huge amounts of money (La 
Vanguardia 2018). These general events can also influence the perception of 
corruption across countries. 
Corruption is also linked to the abundance of natural resources. As the 
world’s leading producer of metals and the second-largest producer of oil, 
Latin America is characterized by having plenty of natural resources. About 
40% of the regional exports come from the extractive industries, which 
represent one of the main sources of the public revenue for economies rich in 
natural resources. For instance, Trinidad and Tobago’s extractive sector is 
32.2% of its GDP. Due to the high volume of financial transactions in the 
sector, it is highly vulnerable to corrupt practices that hamper economic and 
social development (Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 2015). This 
argument is meticulously analyzed by the so-called ‘resource curse’ theory, 
which mainly states that having mineral resources has a negative impact on 
economic growth (Weszkalnys 2011). Some variants of this theory further 
described in this study, like the Dutch Disease theory, also try to explain how 
this curse occurs (Gunesch 2018: 76). One relevant aspect of this theory is the 
institutional analysis, where institutions in resource-rich countries can be 
obstructed by rent-seeking activities or corrupt practices, and instead, good 
institutions can be the means to prevent the resource curse. Ross (2014) 
emphasizes that oil wealth deteriorates the quality of institutions (effectiveness 
of government bureaucracy, controls on corruption, rule of law) and prevents 
the capacity of states to foster economic growth.   
Other authors like Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier et al. (2009) 
mention that mineral resource endowment might lead to violent conflict. Latin 
America is not an exception as it has a history of violent conflicts due to 
natural resources. One example is the Chaco War (1932-1935), where Bolivia 
and Paraguay fought for a region that supposedly had important oil reserves. 
Globally, oil resources tend to increase conflict in two ways: the first is 
governmental conflicts (rebel groups try to control the central government) 
and the second is secessionist conflicts (rebel groups pretend to establish an 
independent and sovereign state). Nevertheless, in Latin America there has 
never been a separatist conflict, becoming a ‘secessionist-proof’ region. This 
characteristic also distinguishes the region from the rest of the world (Ross 
2014).  
 
2 Odebrecht is a Brazilian conglomerate of businesses related to engineering, 
construction, energy, chemicals and petrochemicals (Odebrecht 2019). 
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The Inter-American Development Bank (2015), The World Bank (2017), 
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, German 
Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH) (2016), and other 
organizations, recommend transparency as a tool to reduce the risks of 
corruption and ensure effective governance. According to them, Latin 
American countries must improve transparency in the administration of natural 
resources with well-managed and high-quality information. With proper 
management, the extractive sector can contribute to development through 
better infrastructure, financing of basic services, and technological innovation. 
In this regard, transparency 3 is key not only to prevent corruption but also to 
have an efficient social expenditure that would alleviate poverty and foster 
stability. Thus, these countries have to use transparency as an instrument of 
public policy, plus the adoption of international standards and comparison 
frames. This transparency mechanism as a solution to the resource curse is 
depicted in Figure 2 (Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 2015).  
Figure 2 
Transparency as a Solution to the Resource Curse 
The extractive sector involves 
huge revenues. This 
encourages rent-seeking 
activities that compromise the 
well functioning of institutions, 
hampering economic and 
social development. 
Resource Curse Theory: 
having mineral resources 
has a negative relationship 
with economic growth
Transparency can 
create a 'resource 
blessing'
It helps the management of 
mineral resources, contributing 
to development through a better 
infrastructure, financing of basic 
services, and technological 
innovation. 
It should be a tool of public 
policy reinforced with the 
adoption of international 
standards and comparison 
frames. 
It improves governance and 
deters corruption. Thus, it 
reduces the risk of deviation of 
public funds and is key to have 
an efficient social expenditure.
 




3 According to the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2013), “transparency plays a 
twofold role in governance systems: it determines the quality of institutions and 
shapes the degree of trust and engagement by stakeholders. Still, transparency is only 
one component of the effort to improve governance. Many other factors help shape 
outputs from the extractive industries, and there is no single set of best practices that 
can address all of the challenges in the sector. The quality and outcomes of 
governance can and should be improved through measures appropriate to the specific 
context” (Vieyra and Masson 2014). 
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One international standard that was created to foster this kind of solution 
is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The establishment 
of this scheme was proclaimed by then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 
2002. The principles of this global standard were agreed upon a conference in 
London in June 2003. This scheme “promotes the open and accountable 
management of oil, gas and mineral resources” (EITI, 2019). When a country 
joins the initiative, it commits to being transparent. The purpose of the global 
standard is to avoid corruption in the management of oil, gas, and mineral 
resources. This mechanism works through the disclosure of information in the 
value chain of the extractive industry. It encompasses governments, extractive 
companies from the mining, oil, and gas sectors, civil society groups, and 
international organizations from around the world. The participation of these 
stakeholders, especially civil society4, leads to better accountability and broader 
reforms in the governance of the extractive sector (EITI, 2019).   
Concepts like governance, transparency, and accountability represent what 
this initiative demands. Therefore, the states have to pass through strict 
controls and audits.  This scheme also influences, to some extent, the usage of 
public funds to foster development. Therefore, this mechanism could help 
counter the resource curse by improving the administration of extractive 
industries, avoiding the deviation of funds, and influencing the increased 
quality of life for citizens in the member states. Hence, it is essential to assess 
the performance of this transparency initiative on corruption in Latin America. 
The countries of this region, in summary, share common characteristics, such 
as similar levels of development (most of them are upper middle income), 
perceptions of corruption, wealth in mineral resources, history and culture 
(Caiden 2003). These similarities allow for seeing how the EITI has worked in 
countries with comparable nature. Since, for example, a developed country 
with high performance in transparency would not contribute to the analysis of 
the reduction of corruption. 
Concurring to the statutes of the EITI before 2016, countries had to pass 
through three stages to achieve their optimum level of transparency in the 
mineral resource sector. Those stages are ‘commitment’, ‘candidate’, and 
‘compliant’. In 2016, the EITI Secretariat adopted a different scheme of 
progression: ‘to be assessed’, ‘inadequate progress’, ‘meaningful progress’, and 
 
4 The civil society is included in activities related to “preparing for EITI sign-up; MSG 
meetings; CSO constituency side-meetings on EITI; producing EITI Reports; 
producing materials or conducting analysis on EITI Reports; expressing views related 
to EITI activities; and expressing views related to natural resource governance” (see 




‘satisfactory progress’.5 After the reform, all countries had to be re-assessed 
regarding the new categories. Hence, the statuses for every country changed. 
According to the EITI, these amendments were implemented to give more 
flexibility to country members.6  This research paper will apply the definitions 
used before the reform of 2016. Having in mind that the study period applied 
for this research is between 2002 and 2017 (see Chapter 4), the changes 
introduced after 2016 would not make any difference in the EITI’s impact 
evaluation. 
Currently, fifty-two countries around the world have adopted this global 
standard. In Latin America, nine countries have joined the scheme. One has 
obtained ‘satisfactory progress’, three have ‘meaningful progress’, and five are 
in the stage of ‘to be assessed’. From those nine countries, five which 
expressed commitment before 2015, will be part of this research paper. Peru 
committed to the scheme in 2005, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago in 
2010, Honduras in 2012, and Colombia in 2013 (EITI 2016). The four 
countries omitted are Argentina, Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Mexico. 
Measuring the impact of this initiative in these four countries would be limited 
because of their recent inclusion in the EITI. As the study period is 2002 - 
2017, one or two years are not enough to have significant results. Having 
longer periods will permit us to have a better understanding of how the 
initiative has worked.  
Given the importance that this scheme has obtained around the world, 
many studies have emerged intending to assess its validity. There are mixed 
results reported in diverse quantitative and qualitative methodologies. These 
have focused on different dependent variables, such as corruption, economic 
development, and civil society participation among others. Those that have 
targeted the corruption variable suggest that, in some cases, the EITI 
membership reduces corruption, as in the study of Papyrakis et al. (2016). 
While, in other cases, corruption does not decrease, as in the study of 
 
5 The stage ‘to be assessed’ is equivalent to ‘commitment’ and ‘candidate’. ‘Inadequate 
progress’, ‘meaningful progress’ and ‘satisfactory progress’ are statuses obtained after 
‘to be assessed’ or what was the ‘candidate’ rank previous to the reform. When a 
country has accomplished the majority of requirements, it acquires a ‘meaningful 
progress’ rank. Otherwise, countries receive an ‘inadequate progress’ rank. If the 
country fulfills all requirements, it reaches the rank of ‘satisfactory progress’, which is 
equivalent to being ‘compliant’ (EITI 2016). 
6 The terms of the EITI standard were modified in 2016 in order to expand the scope 
of intervention in the member countries and to consider the diversity of 
implementation. With the new rules it is possible to obtain information about 
exploration activities, licenses and contracts, beneficial owners, and revenue use. 
Moreover, the countries, in the management section, have to take measures to correct 
the issues as well as to strongly adopt the recommendations given to the EITI 
Reports. Hence, the EITI has evolved to cover the issues of the extractive industries 
value chain. Another, modification is regarding the progress of implementation and 
the stages. “Although the bar for achieving compliance has not changed, the 
assessment will to a greater extent take into account the diversity in implementing 
country membership, recognize efforts to go beyond the minimum requirements and 
incentivize continuous improvements in implementation” (EITI 2016). 
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Kasekende et al. (2016). Besides, some of these papers evaluate the EITI’s 
effect across stages of the EITI membership. For example, Papyrakis et al. 
(2016) mention that there is a higher effect of reduction in corruption in the 
second stage ‘candidate’. These studies and others are presented in the 
literature review. The current research paper also assesses the different stages 
of the EITI intervention by presenting graphs and statistics (p-values). 
Considering that it is a country case study, the methodology that best suits this 
research is the Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM), which allows us to 
obtain a synthetic control unit that resembles the unit of intervention. This 
method compared to others gives us some advantages. First, regarding the 
time-series analysis, it avoids extrapolation and drops off the subjectivity of the 
comparison unit selection. Second, compared to the difference-in-difference, it 
permits that the effects of unobserved variables on the outcome vary over 
time. 
1.2 Research objective 
The main objective of the present research is to evaluate the impact of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative on corruption perception in Latin 
American countries across the different stages of its implementation. This 
study applies the Synthetic Control Methodology for the cases of Colombia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. As this methodology is 
applied individually to those five Latin American countries, it is possible to 
compare the different results obtained, not only in the initial year of the EITI 
intervention but also in the following stages. This paper will look further into 
potential causes of the behavior of the treated unit compared to its 
counterfactual. Moreover, different levels of corruption will be analyzed with 
the methodology, which could give us a disaggregated view of perceptions of 
corruption for each country, explained in detail in the data section.    
1.3 Contribution to the literature 
The contribution of this study to the literature is twofold. First in terms of 
methodological aspects and second related to the geographical location. 
Different quantitative methodologies have been applied to test the 
effectiveness of the EITI in countries that opt for it, such as cross-country 
panel regressions and propensity score matching. Most studies have focused 
on the whole sample of country members, having limited research on 
individual case studies. Contrary to panel data analyses that present average 
effects across the whole sample of member states, the Synthetic Control 
Methodology (SCM) allows us to zoom in and look at the effects for each 
specific country.  In this regard, the SCM (also used in the paper of Zambia 
from Villar and Papyrakis 2017) favors the contribution to the scarce individual 
case studies. As explained above, this methodology is a relevant tool because it 
corrects the limitations of time series regressions and difference-in-difference 
methods (Abadie et al, 2015). Furthermore, by applying the SCM, we can 
assess the success or failure of the EITI in the different stages of its 
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implementation. The synthetic unit modelled with the contribution of specific 
country predictor variables will give us a further view of the EITI’s impact on 
three corruption outcome variables (see Chapter 3 for more methodology 
specifications). Concerning the location, there are no empirical studies 
conducted in Latin American countries, except that of Etter (2012) in Peru 
with lack of inferential tests. Moreover, there are no papers that have 
concentrated on cases of the same region. The present research does this to 
take advantage of the common characteristics often present in countries that 
belong to the same region. Having a look at the cases of Latin American 
countries that share common variables could give us a broader view of the 
validity of this global standard. Hence, this study will also contribute to the 
literature by analyzing individual cases that have not been studied before within 
a specific region. 
1.4 Research outline 
Having a general understanding of the background of this research, the 
following chapters will explain concepts and theories in-depth, plus the results 
obtained after applying the empirical method. Chapter 2 encompasses the 
literature review which is divided into five sections. The first talks about the 
resource curse in mineral resource-rich countries. The second presents the 
resource curse and its relation with the institutional variables. The third has a 
deeper description of the EITI. The fourth includes the most important 
studies that have been done related to the EITI, and the last section contains 
information about the studies that determine the prone variables to join the 
EITI. Chapter 3 describes the Synthetic Control Methodology that has been 
chosen to perform this research and the explanation of why this is used in this 
case. Chapter 4 presents the details of the data used for each country including, 
years selected, predictor and outcome variables. Chapter 5 illustrates and 
describes the results obtained for the five countries that are the objects of this 
study, as well as the discussion of the similarities and disparities found among 




2   Literature review 
The EITI targets the improvement of transparency in the mineral resource 
sector which, as expressed in the document of Vieyra and Masson (2014), 
brings better governance, reduction of corruption, efficiency in the 
management of the revenues, and prevents the resource curse. Hence, this 
chapter, divided into five sections, explores more exhaustively concepts related 
to the functioning of the EITI. The first section looks at the resource curse 
theory and its variants with respect to non-institutional variables. The second 
section explicitly focuses on the institutional aspects of the resource curse. The 
third section contains the explanation of the EITI with its limitations. The 
fourth section has relevant studies related to the validation of the EITI in the 
country members. Finally, the fifth section gathers the literature concentrated 
on the determinants of joining this initiative. 
2.1 The ‘resource curse’ of mineral-rich countries 
There is a vast literature related to the ‘resource curse’. This term was coined 
by Professor Richard Auty in 1993 in his book Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Auty 1993). A core meaning of this 
term is that having mineral resources (like oil, gas and other minerals) has a 
negative relationship with economic growth.  The resource curse articulates 
past and present events to predict the future like economic development. Also, 
this theory addresses the failure of economic —including political and social— 
systems, which have tried to be explained by several studies (Weszkalnys 2011). 
The resource curse philosophy has mainly been applied in economic and 
political spheres, considered a tool to analyze more macro than micro-events.  
Some approaches to the mineral resources’ effects have been developed 
over time. In the 50s and 60s, various macro-economic studies argued that 
resource endowment could bring positive economic impacts in the long term. 
This is because the countries would invest in social and technological areas, 
innovation, development, and alleviation of external debt, being more a 
blessing than a curse (Lewis 2013; Innis 1956; Rostow 1960; and Watkins 
1963). However, lately, this hypothesis became the exception instead of the 
rule (Collier 2008). Other studies pinpointed the fact that the trade sector of 
mineral-rich countries worsens over time. That is, the income from mineral 
resources decreases compared to the countries that export high value-added 
products, except in times of mineral commodities booms. Thus, primary 
resource-dependent countries need to export more minerals to balance a 
certain level of imported manufactured commodities (Gilberthorpe and 
Papyrakis 2014: 383).  
More recently, in 1977 a variant of the resource curse was introduced. This 
is the ‘Dutch Disease’, which name is because of the findings of Groningen 
natural gas field in the ‘North Sea of the Netherlands’ north-eastern coast and 
due to the impact that it had in the Dutch economy (currency appreciation,  
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loss of competitiveness of other exportable products, decline of manufacture 
sector, and unemployment), see Gunesch (2018: 76). Indeed, its effects can be 
divided into three, the first one is the ‘Resource Movement Effect’ where 
production factors (capital and labor) move from manufacturing towards the 
primary sector given the changes in relative marginal productivities. The 
second one is the ‘Spending Effect’ that refers to the positive income shock of 
mineral resources that leads to higher demand and spending by the public and 
private sector, causing inflationary pressures. Consequently, salaries increase, 
and the competitiveness of the non-primary sector reduces (Corden 1984). 
That is in detriment to manufacturing and, thus, the economic growth 
(Murshed 2018; Murshed and Serino 2011).  The third one ‘Export-Import 
Competition Theory’ mentions that the rise of exports appreciates the 
currency, which then causes exports to be more expensive and imports 
cheaper, affecting the country’s trade balance (Espinoza et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the ‘Dutch Disease’ is attributed to its roots in 
the learning-by-doing and spill-over effects on the economy (Tovik 2001).  
Other arguments of how the resource curse affects countries are related to 
the reduction of savings and investment rates in the long run. Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2006) mention that this is because capital accumulation is less 
imperative for sustaining future income levels.  Collier et al. (2009) support this 
statement with their study where they found that countries with higher levels 
of mineral resources have negative genuine saving rates. Furthermore, 
Gylfason and Zoega (2006) highlight that mineral countries, which have been 
through population growth, resource depletion drags, rent-seeking, Dutch 
disease, and neglect of education, are more prone to reduce savings and 
investment. On the other hand, the resource curse is explained by the rise in 
debt since the mineral resources serve as collateral, causing later debt crises 
(debt overhang), see Manzano and Rigobon (2001). Another fact is the 
volatility of international prices of mineral resources. These countries can have 
control over the internal production of their primary commodities, but they 
cannot control their price volatility in the global markets, which is 
unpredictable. This provokes a profound instability in the economy because 
they are natural resource-dependent with a lack of product diversification, 
affecting investment and growth (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). All of 
those theories have tried to clarify the negative relationship between mineral 
resources and long-term economic growth (periods of 3 or 4 decades), see 
Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2014: 384) and Gunesch (2018: 82).   
Further aspects associated with the resource curse are democracy, conflict, 
and other social variables. Democracy has been considered a mediating 
variable that leads or not to the resource curse. For instance, in the absence of 
democracy or cases of autocratic regimes during mineral price booms, there is 
a tendency to spend more, causing macroeconomic uncertainty (Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis 2014: 385). Moreover, democracy has also been studied as an 
outcome variable product of increased mineral dependence. For example, Ross 
(2001), with his empirical research, concludes that governments with mineral 
wealth can control and manipulate the different sectors like media corporations 
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to prevent democratic aspirations. Regarding the conflict variable, it is 
suggested that the presence of mineral resources might lead to violent conflict 
because of an unequal distribution of those resources (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998; Collier et al. 2009). Nevertheless, as explained by Gilberthorpe and 
Papyrakis (2014), the influence of mineral resources on conflict (as well as its 
duration and severity) depends on diverse variables such as the location, the 
type of the resource, and heterogeneity of the countries or regions. Besides 
that, other studies have found a negative correlation between mineral resource 
and education, gender inequality, and health. The negative effect on education 
variables is explained by the ‘Resource Movement Effect’; when the 
production factors move to the primary sector, the investment in human 
capital decreases and so on education. Meanwhile, gender inequality 
deterioration is justified by the limited access of women to employment in the 
petroleum sector. Likewise, the health decline (e.g. proxied by child mortality 
and HIV) is the result of poor governance and less investment in a deadly 
disease like HIV (Gylfason 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Ross 2007; 
Daniele 2011; de Soysa and Gizelis 2013).  
Finally, there is an emerging literature to understand localized social, 
political, and economic conditions (Weszkalnys 2011). Some studies have 
concentrated on the effects of the resource curse at the regional and micro 
level. For example, Zhang et al. (2008) showed the differences in growth 
among coastal and inland regions. In the same line, Yuxiang and Chen (2011) 
found that mineral-rich regions in China have a slower speed of financial 
development (a proxy of the ratio of bank loans to GDP). Another analysis is 
provided by Papyrakis and Raveh (2014), where they found that mineral 
regions in Canada had inflationary pressures causing a decrease in 
competitiveness. Regarding the micro-level studies, dominated mainly by 
anthropologists, they try to show the effects of mineral resources at the 
community level, individuals and cultural matters. They highlight the negative 
impacts on poverty, gender equity, and social fragmentation (Hilson 2010, 
2012; Macintyre 2003). Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2014) accordingly express 
that the problems can arise, for example, in indigenous communities where 
people have to adapt their culture to extractive activities with west customs and 
procedures. The different cultures and the lack of compatibility can hamper the 
ability of communities to transform the resource curse into a resource blessing. 
Moreover, they mention that the difference in the way of organizing the 
market economy (mineral-driven) and the subsistence one (rural-based) could 
explain if communities benefit or not from extractive industries. The 
imposition of capitalist principles like individualism, solitary, hierarchy, among 
others, opposed to the indigenous beliefs, can lead to violent and non-violent 
conflict, which is the base of the resource curse (Papyrakis 2016: 11). Lastly, at 
this level the concerns of sustainability are shown. The extractive corporation 
uses this latter term to legitimize and justify their activities where local 
communities reside, damaging people’s living conditions. Thus, these 
communities are vulnerable and powerless to the capitalist discourse 
(Gilberthorpe 2013).  
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2.2 The ‘resource curse’ and its institutional dimension 
The resource curse has been evolving over time and nowadays it has several 
dimensions as explained in the previous section. An important focus of this 
theory, closer correlated with this research topic, is the relationship with the 
institutional dimension, which involves government efficiency, rule of law, 
accountability, corruption, among others. Some studies claim that the 
extractive industries impede the development of good institutional framework. 
This happens because the rents obtained from mineral resources are an 
incentive to the rent-seeking activity. The rent-seeking term, first used by 
Krueger (1974), refers to the “the allocation of resources on political lobbying 
to rise one’s share of existing wealth without generating any value added to the 
economy”. This rent-seeking behavior can take place at different levels. That is, 
politicians can manipulate and distort policies to obtain direct returns from the 
extractive activity (Orogun 2010 and Ross 2001). Meanwhile, firms pay bribes 
to local officials to gain access to mineral sites (Villar and Papyrakis 2016: 798). 
Also, the public demands for more transfers (i.e. higher wages, lump-sum 
transfers, reduced taxes). In such an environment, competition becomes 
endemic and ‘legitimized’, people demand bribes also at a lower level (Boschini 
et al. 2007; Lane and Tornell 1999; Torvik 2002). Consequently, rent-seeking 
causes funds deviation at expenses of the whole population’s wealth, affecting 
institutions. Albeit, rent seeking in the extractive sector can have its limitations 
based, for example, on the opportunity costs in the economy like the gains 
from different economic activities or on the concentration of mineral 
resources (Wick and Bulte 2006; Dejardin 2011). Indeed, the mineral rents can 
cause inefficiency in allocating public funds with low-quality bureaucracy and 
politicians, short-run policies due to the volatility of mineral prices, insufficient 
controls of transparency and rule of law. Hence, they harm institutions and 
impede good governance (Karl 1997; Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Stevens and 
Dietsche 2008).  
Institutions can also be affected by authoritarian regimes that try to curb 
accountability. For that, these regimes channel the mineral revenue to 
strengthen their supremacy to remain in the power (Andersen and Ross 2014; 
Aslaksen 2010; Tsui 2011), counting more on mineral rents than in tax 
revenues because this latter makes them more accountable to citizens 
(McFerson 2010; Ross 2001, 2009). Then, these authoritarian regimes would 
allocate their returns from the extractive activity to internal security, media 
censorship, or free information restriction with the purpose to hide corrupt 
practices. There are some facts like nationalization where the governments 
control the enterprises and the extent of mineral resources that mediate 
democratic accountability (Ross 2001; Dutta and Roy 2009; Egorov et al. 2009; 
Williams 2011). Other studies emphasize that politicians prolong their stay in 
power with the help of the rents and are less accountable due to generous 
supplies to the population. For instance, Paler (2013) found in an experiment 
with 1863 towns that mineral resources can diminish the accountability of 




On the other hand, good institutions (low corruption, efficient 
bureaucracy, secure property right, among others) can also have a mediating 
role to hamper resource curse (Boschini et al. 2007; Kolstad 2009; Mehlum et 
al. 2006; Sarmidi et al. 2014). In other words, strong institutions in resource-
rich countries prevent that extractive industries compete illegally for the rents. 
Low corruption and good governance improve controls and, thus, leads to 
desirable economic growth (El Ansashy and Katsaiti 2013). Good institutions 
can revert the expected negative outcome of the ‘resource curse’ into a 
‘resource blessing’, not only at the macro-level but also at the micro-level. The 
former level can be reached by the right productive investment in promoting 
growth and guaranteeing macroeconomic stability, and the latter level by 
ensuring equity through the correct use of public funds, targeting the 
vulnerable and affected communities (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2014: 384). 
Moreover, a good institutional framework maximizes social welfare and sets up 
the environment to attract investment and to ease commercial success (Calder 
and Culverwell 2005). For example, strong financial institutions that can deal 
with unexpected fluctuations in resource income, transparency, and physical 
access to the international markets lessen the negative externalities of the price 
volatility of the primary sector (Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).  
2.3 The EITI mechanism 
“Resource-rich countries with satisfactory standards of governance and cor-
ruption control, complemented by good corporate governance practices, 
demonstrate better growth, and development results” (Vieyra and Masson 
2014). This definition implies that the good governance of natural resources 
can prevent the resource curse, which translates into development and growth. 
The resource curse theory brings about the paradox of having mineral 
resources and not generating the expected growth. This uncovers the flaws of 
the governance systems to manage the wealth that boost countries’ economies 
(Vieyra and Masson 2014). Pegg (2006) argues that the extractive sector has to 
be well managed with transparency and efficiency to foster economic growth 
and to reduce poverty. Transparency can expose the weakness and 
malfunctioning of institutional systems that rule the extractive industries, 
which encourage a better behavior of stakeholders of the sector, as well as the 
correction of the failures detected.7 Hence, based on the hypothesis that 
 
7 Some studies back the transparency hypothesis or focus on the measures to prevent 
the resource curse. Gunesch (2018: 91,92), for example, suggests some alternatives to 
drive correctly the economy in resource-rich countries. The socio-political solutions 
he mentions as principals are strengthening the domestic institutions and democratic 
checks and balances. Meanwhile, the main socioeconomic solutions he suggests are 
good governance and wealth distribution, as well as public sector investment for 
private sector growth. Other secondary solutions or derived from them are: careful 
macroeconomic management, renewable energy investment, foreign development aid 
addressed to export promotion and diversification. Papyrakis (2017: 13) also indicates 




transparency and better governance in the extractive sector leads to 
development, new laws, voluntary and binding standards, protocols, guidelines, 
and benchmarking and reporting schemes have emerged through the last 
decades (Vieyra and Masson 2014). 
Within the standards created under the presented premises8, we can 
distinguish the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), to which 
countries adhere voluntarily to increase transparency, to cope with their 
problems of corruption, and to improve governance in the extractive sector. If 
we compare the EITI with the other initiatives, it involves the commitment of 
the governments, while the other standards support organizations or private 
mineral firms to promote transparency. For example, Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP) is a network that works with specific organizations within a country 
and not directly with the government (Van Alstine 2017). Thus, the EITI 
allows us to perform this study at the country level. It is important to highlight 
that these initiatives aim at the development of social relationships. That is, 
social actors that have traditionally been excluded (media, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), private investment funds, and indigenous communities) 
in the management of the mineral resources, now interact to shape rules, 
norms, and policies in the sector (Vieyra and Masson 2014). This has driven 
the public and private sector, with the collaboration of diverse partakers, to 
instrument reforms that improve the regulatory and institutional frameworks 
—such as transparency and citizen participation. Otherwise, the absence of the 
inclusion of these stakeholders can hamper the legitimacy of decision making 
and investment, as well as security and sustainability (Vieyra and Masson 2014). 
Accordingly, the EITI contributes to preventing an ‘institutional resource 
curse’ by strengthening the accountability system of the government and the 
companies and informing the civil society (Papyrakis et al. 2016).  
Countries that join this initiative have to pay USD 10.000 per year as a 
contribution to the services given by the EITI. Additionally, each member has 
to find the funds to accomplish the activities and costs generated in the 
implementation process (from USD100.000 to several million per annum, 
depending on the plan drawn up by each country). Some countries can obtain 
financial support from international development organizations like the World 
Bank. By the EITI’s side, it is funded by international organizations, some 
major donor countries, extractive industries, and the contribution of the 
implementing countries (EITI 2016). The mechanism of this initiative consists 
basically of the disclosure of information on the payments done by the 
government as well as by the extractive companies. Although this scheme 
 
8 Other initiatives have also been identified. One is Publish What You Pay (PWYP), 
which is a global network with the purpose that nations benefit from natural resources 
wealth by promoting voluntary transparency. Others are the Extractive Industries 
Review of the World Bank (2001–2003) and the Mining Minerals and Sustainable 
Development project (2000–2002) of the International Council on Mining and Metals. 
Both seek “to align the sector with the goals of sustainable development and achieve 




might not cover all governance failure, it can potentially contribute to improve 
transparency and reduce corruption to some extent. The countries that declare 
commitment further give a signal that they would make efforts to have better 
institutions. This because not only the government has the obligation to 
provide the information relative to the amount of contract but also the 
companies show the same financial information. Thus, it is possible to see 
other contestants’ cash flows and tax liabilities. The civil society, in turn, can 
access the published information through the multi-stakeholder platform, 
which improves accountability (Papyrakis et al. 2016). 
Moreover, the countries that have decided to implement this initiative in 
its national territory must go through different stages to obtain the status of 
‘compliant’, which is the highest or optimal step in the process (EITI 2016).   
Figure 3 
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In the first stage, the government has to express commitment to the EITI 
through a public document that guaranties its implementation. Then, a multi-
stakeholder (MSG) group made up of the government, the companies, and the 
civil society has to be established. Each party can nominate its representatives, 
for example, there are some cases where the civil society has done it by the 
caucus. From them, one individual has to be the chairman, elected by the 
government. This group has the obligation to set a plan for the disclosure of 
the information and improving transparency. After the accomplishment of 
these requirements, the country through the MSG applies to the EITI Board to 
obtain its status of ‘candidate’ (the period to become candidate varies from 
country to country, for instance, Colombia and Guatemala took one year, Peru 
two years, and other countries like Ethiopia took 5 years). Since then, the 
country has to satisfy several EITI requirements such as: good functioning of 
the multi-stakeholder group (it has to execute the plan timely and to ensure the 
collaboration of the government, the companies, and the civil society),  
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disclosure of information of the mineral sector (legal and institutional 
framework, allocation of contracts and licenses), provision of exploration and  
production information, release of financial flows (taxes, revenues, payments), 
revenue allocations, social and economic spending, and presentation of the 
information along with civil society dialogues. The progress made by the 
country is later reviewed by the EITI Board that decides if the country has 
accomplished the requirements or has to modify something to become 
‘compliant’ (third stage), see Papyrakis et al. (2016). The whole process can 
take from 2.5 up to 7 years (since they become candidates), depending on the 
progress of each country (for more detailed information about the process, 
requirements, and periods see www.eiti.org). Figure 3 schematically shows this 
process (EITI 2019).  
The limitation of this initiative is that corruption can also be present in the 
various stages of the process. For instance, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) mention 
that the multi-stakeholder group engaged in the validation process can 
themselves fall in the temptation of rent-seeking and patronage. The value 
chain of the extractive industries, as well as the process of procurement and 
public spending, can also be an open door to corrupt practices (Papyrakis et al. 
2016). Other researchers say that EITI-member states and the private sector 
would not disclose complete and consistent information (Dykstra 2011; Gillies 
and Heuty 2011; Ravat and Ufer 2010). According to Lujala et al. (2017), this 
global standard is also limited to corruption perception because it encompasses 
just one sector of the whole country’s corruption. Therefore, its effects can be 
arguable. 
Moreover, Global Witness (2016) and Aaronson (2011) claim that the 
contribution from civil society can be restricted during the process. Similar, 
Dykstra (2011) and Van Alstine (2017) highlight that civil society stakeholders 
in implementing countries are intimidated, hampering their independence. 
Lujala et al. (2017) state that the role of civil society can have little effect if it is 
not strong in the country of intervention. Aaronson (2011) adds that the 
initiative is a limited partnership because the governments, civil society, and 
companies are unaware or have dissimilar visions about the EITI, which would 
affect to counter corruption. Therefore, Klein (2017) mentions the relevance 
of the disclosure of information to citizens and local communities. In some 
cases, the format in which the information is provided is not properly 
presented or is in another language that some locals do not understand. Thus, 
the international standard fails as an accountability mechanism (Klein 2017).   
2.4 Studies on EITI’s effects on institutions 
Several types of researches have been produced with the purpose to assess the 
validity of the EITI, which are closely related to this empirical investigation. 
Usually, the evaluations have concentrated on estimating the EITI’s average 
effect on the whole participant countries, and few on individual case studies. 




Regarding the studies implemented on the whole sample of EITI 
members, it is possible to find that of Corrigan (2014). Her study, using a 
pooled cross-sectional panel analysis, found that corruption (although small 
magnitude, but statistically significant) can reduce in the stage of ‘commitment’ 
when governments start to perform actions to become candidates. Thus, the 
willingness to increase transparency affects corruption. Nevertheless, the 
author mentions that the study is inconclusive given that it does not rely on 
long periods of the EITI implementation. Hence, she suggests conducting 
further studies in the coming years. In the same line, Papyrakis et al. (2016) test 
the EITI’s impact on corruption in the different stages of implementation by 
using a cross-country panel regression. They conclude suggesting that countries 
that participate in this scheme tend to shield themselves against corruption 
propensity, especially in the second stage when they become candidates. In this 
stage, the countries make the greatest effort to get the compliance status where 
they have to accomplish timely the disclosure of information and financial 
flows of the mineral sector. Thus, their effort to fight against corruption in this 
stage is stronger. 
Kasekende et al. (2016) use a Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) methodology to avoid selection bias present in the model of Corrigan 
(2014) and previous studies (EITI members are not randomly selected). The 
FIML estimates jointly the selection process (i.e. joining the EITI and 
corruption outcome), which permits the correlation between the error term 
and the outcomes. With this method, they found that there is no indication 
that corruption dropped after adopting the EITI (a small increase in 
corruption, statistically significant). Therefore, they advise performing more 
case studies to see the individual effect of why the EITI implementation might 
or not work. Based on their findings, they claim that the EITI alone is not 
enough to bring accountability and to counter corruption. For example, they 
mention that civil society organizations should be more involved in the 
process.  
Furthermore, another study that contributes to this literature with no 
impact on corruption is that of Ogë (2016). He performed an analysis on the 
EITI members to see the change in transparency and corruption. By doing so, 
he uses interrupted time series and panel data fixed-effects analysis. His study 
suggests that corruption did not change (no statistically significant) in the 
period of study. Nevertheless, the HRV index of transparency improved 
overall. 9 Given the complexity of the mineral resource value chain, this analysis 
advises that the EITI (disclosure of information) is not enough to tackle 
corruption. It would be necessary to implement broader measures from the 
 
9 HRV is an index that uses data from the World Bank in order to capture 
transparency in the countries. This highlights governments' tendencies to disclose 
information. That is, governments that release more data are likely to have higher 
HRV scores. “The HRV index is a measure of a government's capacity and intent to 
disclose even if it does not quite capture institutional and media related aspects of 
transparency. Moreover, this index unlike many indices of governance it is not based 
on subjective views of experts, but rather on objective criteria” (Ogë 2016). 
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parliaments and independent auditing bodies (Dykstra 2011), as well as more 
inclusion of non-governmental organizations (Ogë 2016). The finding of Ogë 
(2016) about corruption is also confirmed later by Corrigan (2017). By 
correcting her previous study (2014) and using panel data country fixed effects 
and several Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions, she does not find 
evidence of improvements in control of corruption (no statistically significant 
result).  
Sovacool et al. (2016) do not find an impact on governance variables 
either, including corruption. They analyzed 16 countries that achieved the 
EITI’s compliant status. By using a non-parametric test (like the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test) and regression analysis with the World Bank data, they infer 
that EITI countries do not perform better on governance metrics (hypothesis 
supported by 86.1% of their tests). Thus, they do not outperform other 
countries. In other words, the results suggest that the effects of the EITI 
scheme on governance variables are not better during ‘candidate’ and 
‘compliant’ stages than the pre-EITI period. This could be explained by the 
potential weakness of the EITI due to limited mandate, its voluntary nature, 
stakeholder resistance, and dependence on strong civil society. Moreover, they 
warn that the method is limited because of non-random assignation of units to 
treatment and control groups. Therefore, the method is quasi-experimental, 
and the interpretations are correlative between EITI indicators and governance 
variables. Hence, further researches on the EITI’s impact have to be 
conducted with more variables, longer periods of the EITI implementation, 
and individual case studies.  
Individual case studies give us further information to counter or to 
support the results obtained in the analyses implemented in whole EITI 
members.  One key study for the performance of this research paper is that of 
Zambia. Villar and Papyrakis (2017), by using a case-comparison approach 
named Synthetic Control Method (SCM), present a rigorous quantitative 
analysis to assess the impact of the EITI in Zambia’s corruption. The results, 
based on data from World Bank Indicators and Transparency International, 
provide evidence of reduction of corruption, especially in previous stages to 
obtain the candidacy and compliance status (different to Papyrakis et al. (2016) 
where there is more evidence in the second stage). In these latter two phases, 
the results are statistically significant, although these are of small magnitude. 
They suggest replicating the model in other country members with the purpose 
to contribute to the literature of individual case studies.  
Moreover, in previous studies, this SCM has also been used. The case 
study corresponds to Etter (2012) who used counterfactual analyses, i.e. the 
SCM and the Entropy Balancing to determine the impact of the EITI on Mali 
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and Peru.10 They used pre-processing techniques to give weights to the non-
EITI control group, which would be the counterfactual unit. The advantage of 
the SCM is that it controls for the homogeneity between the pre-EITI 
synthetic group and the treated unit. This helps to differentiate if unobserved 
characteristics would confound the estimated weighting given to the synthetic 
group.  In this research, Etter (2012) suggests that the introduction of the EITI 
has a positive impact on the reduction of corruption in Peru, but no effect on 
Mali (no statistically significant). The failure of this study is that it did not 
analyze the statistical significance of the SCM results, neither tested the EITI’s 
impact of compliant stages.  
Another study on the EITI’s performance is that of Azerbaijan and 
Liberia in 2009. Here, the authors Sovacool and Andrews (2015), using a 
qualitative approach with data from the World Bank, illustrated the time-trend 
between the years 2006-2012. They found a reduction in corruption in 
Azerbaijan, but not in Liberia. The results for the latter case could be due to 
the lack of political support to the scheme. Moreover, they argue that hardly 
governance improvements are given by the EITI implementation. Hence, the 
metrics of governance seem to be worsened after the countries achieved 
compliance status. This paper also mentions that transparency is just one factor 
that contributes to the proper management of mineral resources or to reduce 
corruption; thus, other characteristics should also be considered. Similar to 
Liberia’s results, Hoinathy and Janszky (2017), who used qualitative research 
with civil society groups in Chad, found that the EITI’s effect on corruption 
and poverty is very limited, while the benefits remain in the oil companies and 
the state. 
Besides the focus on institutional variables, some studies have tried to 
relate the EITI with the economic variables to test the theory that increased 
transparency counters the resource curse. In the same study of corruption 
from Corrigan (2017), she found that joining the EITI would explain a 
significant and positive effect on economic development. The disclosure of 
information mechanism improves the environment for business, investment, 
and citizen purchasing power, which leads to economic growth (Corrigan 2017: 
784). Also, Malden (2017: 788), using panel data (propensity score matching) 
from 167 countries, found that the EITI implementation increases the 
country’s mineral investment attractiveness. That is the increase in grassroots 
exploration expenditure, which captures the value of mining companies’ 
 
10 “Both methods rely on a single counterfactual case that best resembles to the 
treated unit, which is estimated from a ‘donor pool’ on a set of observable variables. 
Contrary to the SCM, the Entropy balancing is a reweighting method that produces 
covariate balancing that is superior compared to other alternative weighting methods 
(Hainmueller, 2011). Furthermore, because entropy balancing only uses covariate 
information before the introduction of the treatment, it provides the opportunity to 
use the weighted sample to conduct further analysis using any econometric model the 
researcher would like to specify. On the other hand, the advantage of SCM is that it 
lets the researcher reveal the contribution each unit of the donor pool has made to the 
synthetic control unit and therefore increases confidence in the methodology in the 
eye of the reader” (Etter 2012). 
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exploration expenditure budgets in every country. Therefore, the commitment 
of a country to be transparent is a signal for exploration and mining companies 
to invest in the country (Malden 2017: 793). Nevertheless, these studies are 
countered by the findings of Sovacool et al. (2016) who demonstrated that the 
impact of the EITI on economic development variables (foreign direct 
investment, GDP per capita) is not statistically significant.   
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as authoritarian states and found that even if 
the civil society is mentioned in the MSG, NGOs’ roles of accountability and 
control are limited because of political pressures and harassment. Besides that, 
by using interrupted time-series analysis, it concludes that civil society 
organizations’ participation does not improve after joining the EITI. Also, 
Hoinathy and Janszky (2017) find that the EITI process in Chad is centralized, 
which prevents the contribution of transparency experts and the educated elite. 
According to them, the EITI has made available civil participation, but the 
concept of civil society must be carefully addressed because these stakeholders 
might be representing their own interests and not the communities’ ones. 
2.5 Studies on the determinants of joining and 
implementing the EITI 
With the purpose to justify the participation of countries on the EITI, few 
qualitative and quantitative studies have been performed. These have focused 
on the reasons why countries join the scheme or why some make more 
progress than others. Regarding the studies that look for the likelihood of 
joining the EITI, it can be mentioned those of Pitlik et al. (2010), David-
Barrett and Okamura (2016), Öge (2016), and Kasekende et al. (2016). By 
using different methodologies —Cox proportional hazard model, cross-section 
analysis, and panel data— and different cut-off points concerning the EITI 
membership dependent variable, they found common characteristics that 
suggest more likelihood of the countries to join this scheme, such as more 
dependency on the mineral sector, higher corruption, and poverty. Also, 
countries with increased openness and political freedom, as well as with more 
ethical diversity, would be more willing to join the EITI (David-Barrett and 
Okamura 2016 and Pitlik et al. 2010).   
In the same line, the study of Lujala (2018) proposes three categories that 
would influence the progress of the EITI implementation: internal motivation 
(natural resource dependence, resource curse experience, development level, 
FDI flows, corruption), internal capacity (quality of institutions, development 
level), and pressure from outside (post-conflict country, aid and development 
assistance, external debt). This research also remarks that internal motivation is 
driven by governments’ or ruling elites’ interests.  This study used a survival 
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analysis adapted for ordered multiple failure-time data11,  with which he 
distinguishes the variables that determine the countries’ decision to join and to 
progress in the implementation of this international standard, encompassing 
the whole EITI process. He finds that all the factors mentioned are significant 
to the evolution of the EITI implementation. More in-depth, his results 
suggest that the faster implementation of the EITI is influenced by resource-
dependency, previous experience of resource curse, being poorer or richer, 
good levels of governance, high levels of voice and accountability, higher FDI 
flows, dependence on assistance, and recent major conflict (post-conflict 
country is ‘major war’ variable with at least 1000 battle-related deaths). 
Meanwhile, he highlights that external debt and high corruption levels together 
with high dependence on mineral rents reduce the likelihood of implementing 
the scheme. On the other hand, he remarks that the variables aligned with the 
speed of implementation (higher levels of FDI and recent major conflict) also 
increase the probability to join the EITI. Contrary, Magno and Gatmaytan 
(2017), using an ordered logit model, found that weak rule of law and 
government ineffectiveness tend to make the countries accomplish with the 
EITI’s requirements. He also claims that higher corruption increases the 
likelihood of the country to meet the requirements. Other variables that imply 
the compliance of the EITI are freedom of expression and association, 
inquiring the importance of having a civic space (Magno and Gatmaytan 2017).  
Alternatively, addressing the political sphere, we can find the study of the 
Andes by Bebbington et al. (2017), which includes Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia. They used qualitative techniques such as interviews and results from 
the EITI Global Meetings held in Lima in 2016.  Their postulate, also 
mentioned in Lujala (2018), was that the motivation to join the standard 
depends on the nature of the elite’s politics, its interests, and pacts. The 
incentive to adhere to the EITI also resides on the power relations and the 
capacity of those in power to sell the idea of the goodness of the initiative for 
the country. Hence, its instrumentalization encompassed several actors. They 
found that in Peru (early adopter) and Colombia (late adopter) the 
transnational and domestic civil society influenced the acquisition of the 
international standard. Also, Colombia was pressured by its interest in joining 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Meanwhile, Bolivia (non-adopter) rejected the international standard due to the 
resource nationalist politics led by the emerging elite in 2005 (Bebbington et al. 
2017). 
 
11 “This approach is used to analyze the duration of the EITI implementation process 
using the six stages (government commitment, establishment of the MSG, candidate, 
first EITI report, first validation report, and compliant), as the ‘failures’ (also called 
events). The shorter the period of time between these ‘failures’, the faster the country 
is progressing through the implementation process. Survival analysis methods (also 
called duration analysis and event history analysis) are used when the outcome variable 
is the time to the occurrence of the event of interest (e.g. death, end of war, or 
marriage). Survival analysis of ordered multiple failure-time data analyzes data series 
with several sequential events that follow each other in time” (Lujala 2018). 
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3  Methodology 
3.1 Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) 
The Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) has been chosen to perform this 
analysis because this is a method suitable for small samples with qualitative 
characteristics like case studies employed in political science. It serves to 
evaluate the effects of policy interventions, such as the EITI implementation, 
which has the nature to influence aggregate entities (countries, regions, cities). 
Usually, these events have been tested through comparative case study 
researches that estimate the effect on aggregate outcomes (such as mortality, 
average income, etc.) for the unit treated given a particular intervention and 
then, they compare it to the evolution of estimated unaffected units (Abadie et 
al. 2010: 493). Nevertheless, the performance of comparative case study 
researches can suffer from selection bias of the comparison units due to the 
use of subjective measures of resemblance between affected and unaffected 
units. Hence, the SCM relies on a data-driven approach that can obtain one or 
more combinations of possible comparison units that best match the unit of 
interest. Moreover, contrary to what the SCM does, the traditional inference 
techniques do not reflect the uncertainty about the capacity of the control units 
to replicate the counterfactual outcome trajectory (treated unit in the absence 
of intervention), see Abadie et al. (2010: 493). More in-depth, by using the 
SCM, it is possible to select comparison units with similar characteristics to the 
unit of study that has been the object of an intervention (Abadie et al. 2015: 
495). Thus, these units selected are meant to be the counterfactual that has not 
suffered any event or intervention. The comparison units are given different 
weights that produce a synthetic unit that resembles the behavior of the focus 
country as closely as possible in the pre-intervention period. (Abadie et al. 
2015: 496). 
This method has some advantages compared to others that could be 
applied. Considering the Difference-in-Difference methodology, both are 
interested in the difference between treated and untreated units regarding an 
intervention (Galiani and Quistorff 2016). Nevertheless, they differ because the 
SCM does not assign all the untreated units the same weight in comparison. 
Instead, the average weights given to the control units are higher when there is 
more similarity to the treated unit in the pre-treatment period. Then, the post-
treatment period outcomes are projected using the weights assigned, being this 
the counterfactual of the unit of interest. Also, with this, we can perform 
inference through placebo tests (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 
2010).  Furthermore, the SCM avoids extrapolation biases, which are present in 
time series outcomes. In other words, the time-series regression does not limit 
the coefficients of the linear combination that define the synthetic control to 
be between 0 and 1 (Abadie et al. 2015: 498). Finally, considering that the pre-
intervention period both observed and unobserved variables have a linear 
relationship, it is possible to predict the outcomes of those unobserved 
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variables (Abadie et al. 2010). To explain the model in mathematical terms 
regarding the SCM and inference methodology, the notation and description 




Within the observed covariates, we have the treated and untreated units, 
represented by ), where is the treated unit (Colombia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago) and from j=2 to (   
are the untreated units or non-EITI countries, called also ‘donors’ or ‘donor 
pool’. The donor pool is restricted to the units that could match the units of 
interest and have not suffered any shock during the period of analysis that 
could affect the outcome of the evaluation, in this case, corruption. T is the 
total number of periods observed (years), which have to be balanced for all 
units in the pre-treatment and post-treatment period.  represents the (  
vector of corruption outcomes for unit J. Letting  be (   matrix of 
corruption outcomes for the donor pool and  be (  matrix of 
corruption outcomes for each treated unit.  These corruption outcomes can 
also be split up into pre and post-EITI vectors,  =  . Thus, the pre-
treatment outcomes of EITI are denoted by  and . Then,  represents 
the ensemble of pre-EITI predictors of corruption . Therefore,  is the 
notation assigned to the vector  of predictors from the donor pool, 
while   is given by the  matrix of the same predictors for every 
treated unit of our cases of comparison studies.   is given by  variable-
weight matrix is the relative significance of the predictors of corruption  on 
. Finally, we have  which is the (  weighted matrix of 
, where   and , 
meaning that the average of donors’ corruption outcome or the ‘synthetic unit’ 
is just . 
Given this, what the SCM does is to obtain the ideal combinations of 
weightings in  that best represents the unit subject to the intervention by 
minimizing the distance between the treated and the weighted donors. 
. That distance is outlined as 
root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE). As explained above what we can 
infer with this last term is that the corruption outcomes  are affected by 
observed  and unobserved variables , . After running SCM we 
obtain the weights  that leads to similar X values between the treated unit 
and the control units, with which it is possible to obtain the minimum absolute 
value of , implying similar values for  (Abadie et al. 2010). 
If we obtain the right weighting that matches the synthetic control with 
the treated unit trajectory, then the impact for each post-EITI year can be 
obtained by the difference between the treatment’s corruption outcome and 
the synthetic units’ one, given by:  
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         (1) 
 
Nevertheless, this method of subtracting the corruption outcome between 
the treated and the synthetic unit has one limitation. This does not permit 
direct analysis of varying treatment effects across the time, as it is required in 
our study to test the effect in different stages of subscription of the countries 
to the EITI scheme. For that, instead, it is possible to measure the treatment 







As mentioned in Abadie et al. (2010), the inference method has a limited scope 
in the cases of small sample nature of data, the absence of randomization, or if 
the probabilistic sampling was not employed to the selection of sample units. 
Therefore, some methods of inference have been developed related to 
permutation tests. With the first one, once we have obtained the counterfactual 
unit, it is possible to find falsification exercises with ‘placebo studies’ to see the 
statistical significance. That is, we can get the statistical significance of the 
differences between the synthetic units and our units of interest. The process 
consists of re-applying the SCM to the donor pool to obtain a distribution of 
placebo effects or also known as ‘in place’ placebo effects (Galiani and 
Quistorff 2016: 4). The confidence that the synthetic control reflects the effect 
of the EITI would vanish if larger estimates emerge in the units that were not 
subject to the intervention. This inferential procedure can be characterized by 
being a randomization inference when the intervention of the EITI is 
randomized (Rosenbaum 2005). However, the study cases presented in this 
paper are not randomized. Thus, the p-value that compares the distribution of 
placebo effects and the synthetic control can be at least interpreted as the 
likelihood of obtaining an estimated effect large enough as the unit of interest, 
being an informative interpretation. As expressed by Galiani and Quistorff 
(2016), if the estimated effect for our treated units is characterized by 1t and 
the distribution of the respective placebos’ resultant from the non-EITI 
countries is , so the two-sided p-value is represented by: 
p-value =  (3) 
 
The other two inference methods that can be used, according to Abadie et 
al. (2010), consider further the quality of the selection of the control units from 
the donor pool. This because if the units were not matched properly in the pre-
treatment period, it can lead to high conservative p-values due to large placebo 
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effects. Therefore, the subsequent method consists in restricting the donor 
pool to those that best match the intervened unit (Galiani and Quistorff 2016: 
5). In other words, the units that have to be kept are those with similar pre-
EITI RMSPE as the treated units. Moreover, some parameters are suggested 
by Abadie et al. (2010) to limit the donor pool. For instance, the donor pool 
has to be restricted to those units that have a RMSPE at most twice as large 
(RS(2)), 5 times as large (RS(5)) or 20 times as large (RS(20)) as the unit of 
interest (imposing a cut-off point is subjective, thus a limitation for the 
method) (Villar and Papyrakis 2016: 798). Another flaw of this inference 
method is that for being informative the restricted sample size has to be large 
enough. For instance, for obtaining a confidence interval of 5% the sample has 
to have at least 20 units, computed as . The restriction results in 
another trade-off between the better match and the reduction of the level of 
confidence. That is why it is better to stick to the p-values with the restrictions 
described above that allow us to have a confidence interval of 5%.  
The last and third method introduced by Abadie et al. (2010) corrects for 
the restriction of the donor pool and the subjective chosen cut-off point. In 
order to do that, the distance of the deviation in the pre-treatment period 
between the treated unit and the synthetic control is considered informative for 
inferring the deviation in the treatment period. Furthermore, Galiani and 
Quistorff (2016) mention that this test adapts the estimated effects gauged in 
the treatment period against the pre-EITI deviation for avoiding too 
conservative p-values. Mathematically expressing is the division of the post-
EITI effect size estimate by the pre-EITI RMSPE.  Akin to the first method, 
p-values are obtained from the non-EITI countries which have an estimated 
effect large enough as the unit of interest. 
Finally, with the purpose to distinguish among these methods, the first 
one can be denoted as Non-Restricted Donor Sample method (NRDS), the 
second one as Restricted Donor Sample method (RS(n), being n the cut-off 
parameter), and the third one as Adjusted Non-Restricted Donor Sample 
method (ANRDS) (Villar and Papyrakis 2016: 798).  
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4   Data description 
4.1 Period of analysis 
This study uses the period 2002-2017 to assess the EITI’s effect on corruption 
variables in five Latin American countries: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The year 2002 was chosen as the beginning 
year because this is when the operations of EITI started. Before that year, 
there was not any EITI intervention in the world, which would not represent 
any value added to use previous years to obtain the synthetic unit of the 
intervened countries. That is all the countries were control units. For instance, 
the first country to join the scheme in our research is Peru in 2005, three years 
later of the initial year of our data.  Thus, we can start whichever comparison 
analyses since 2002. Moreover, the year 2017 is the limit because the sources 
used had no further data available for the treated and non-treated units.  
 The Synthetic Control Methodology, as explained in the introduction and 
methodology sections, allows us to see the effect of an intervention in 
individual case studies, not only in the period that the event occurred but also 
in the periods that follow. Therefore, the model is applied for the first year of 
the EITI intervention in each country, where governments start to take 
measures to be part of this initiative.  In this stage, according to Corrigan 
(2014), the public expression of commitment to the EITI is a signal to the 
world that the government will implement measures to tackle corrupt 
practices. Hence, the pre-treatment period will be modeled according to each 
country’s year of commitment as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Year of each EITI implementation stage per country 
Country Year of commitment Year of candidature Year of compliance  
Colombia 2013 2014 
 
Guatemala 2010 2011 2014 
Honduras 2012 2013 
 
Peru 2005 2007 2012 
Trinidad and Tobago 2010 2011 2015 
 Source: Author’s elaboration with the EITI’s webpage information  
 
 
The information related to the different stages of the EITI for each 
country was retrieved from the EITI’s webpage, where it is possible to find the 
country’s profile timeline. Furthermore, information about the progress and 





4.2 Outcome variables 
With the purpose to check the EITI’s effect on corruption, three different 
outcome variables are used, one from World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
(2019) and two from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (2019).12, 13  These 
sources build aggregate indicators on governance per country with the help of 
sub-indices that come from databases of different organizations. The metrics 
reflect citizens’ perception of corruption (stakeholders of the public and 
private realm, at the firm and household level), in this case, from Latin 
American countries.  
The index for corruption that corresponds to the WGI is called ‘Control of 
Corruption’. This measure captures “the perception of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the capture of the state by 
elites and private interests” (World Governance Indicators (WGI) 2019). This 
index ranges between approximately -2.5 and 2.5 points; the lower number 
represents weak governance (high levels of corruption) and the high number is 
strong governance (low levels of corruption).  
The indices for corruption used from the V-Dem database range between 
0 and 1, where 0 is less corrupt and 1 more corrupt. The first one is ‘Public sector 
corruption’, which measures “to what extent do public sector employees grant 
favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or inducements, and how often do 
they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources 
for personal or family use”. The second one is ‘Regime corruption’, this “focuses 
on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a 
more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the 
conceptualization of corruption in the literature on neopatrimonial rule” 
(Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 2019).  
Given the contradiction of measurement between these two sources, it 
was necessary to transform the WGI indicator by multiplying for (-1). That is 
the lower numbers to less corrupt and the higher numbers to more corrupt. 
Hence, we harmonize both sources. In the literature, we usually find the 
performance of studies with the WGI and International Transparency 
 
12 The WGI are metrics from the World Bank in terms of governance. This data come 
from dozens of separate sources fed by several organizations like the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Gallup World Poll, and 
Transparency International, the European Bank for Reconstruction, among others. 
This is data is based on the perception of governance from 31 sources from 25 
different organizations, which is a compilation of different stakeholders and points of 
view. It also encompasses national surveys of governance (households and business), 
assessments from research institutions and commercial enterprises. The indicators 
have different ranges, depending on the variable (WGI 2019).  
13 The other source V-Dem contains information of democracy, rule of law, 
corruption, accountability, among others. The data is collected from 19 million data 
points in 201 countries from 1789 to 2017. They obtain the most precise information 
half from constitutions and government records and half from political practices and 




indicators. Nevertheless, the latter database changed the way of measuring the 
corruption index and its scale, so the new measurement is not comparable with 
that of previous 2012. That is why we use WGI and V-Dem instead of 
International Transparency indices.  
In general, these three metrics will give us three distinctive perspectives on 
corruption. ‘Control of Corruption’, for instance, has a broad perspective of 
corruption at all levels in the public sector. It encompasses both petty and 
grand forms of corruption which includes political and private interests. On 
the other hand, ‘Public sector corruption’ outcome variable includes perceptions of 
corruption of the typical person employed by the public sector (closer 
experience of the population) that receives bribes in exchange for favors or 
steals public funds or other resources. Whilst, the ‘Regime corruption’ captures the 
corruption committed by politicians (high positions in the executive, legislative, 
and judicial). Hence, it is possible to see the overall picture of corruption, and 
also at the disaggregated level, that is the corruption of regular employees and 
that of the politicians. As mentioned by Fischle (2000) individuals perceive 
corruption based on partisanship and prior experiences since a person can be 
more susceptible to regular practices of corruption instead of political ones 
(included media scandals), but the perceptions may vary at different levels.  
4.3 Predictor variables 
To build our synthetic unit that predicts the counterfactual corruption 
outcome ( ), it is necessary to rely on a certain number of predictor variables 
( ). The predictor variables have been selected according to the literature 
(usually cross-country empirical analysis) that mentions the possible causes of 
corruption. For instance, Serra (2006: 226), as well as Treisman (2000), found 
that the variables that would determine corruption would be: economic 
development, religion, colonial heritage, uninterrupted democracy, and political 
stability. Shabbir and Anwar (2007) mention that the variables that would 
explain corruption in developing countries are: economic freedom, distribution 
of income, level of development, and globalization. Moreover, Ades and Di 
Telia (1999), Brunetti and Weder (2003), and Persson et al. (2003) highlight 
that corruption is related to the openness to foreign trade, freedom of 
information, electoral system respectively. More information about the 
determinants can be seen in Elbahnasawy and Revier (2012), Ata and Arvas 
(2011), Jain (2001), Park (2003), Ali and Isse (2003). Based on these findings, 
this paper uses similar or proxy predictor variables to construct the synthetic 
corruption outcome, depending on the availability of the data. See Appendix 2 
for the description of the variables used. Using the predictor variables in the 
pre-intervention allows us to control for unobserved variables, which also 
determine the weights for the synthetic units by corruption outcome. Including 
also the corruption outcome variable in the predictors of pre-EITI, it reduces 
the sensitivity of the weighting procedure of the unobserved variables and 
helps for a better match between the control and the synthetic (the predictors 
indices are used as average value for every variable in the pre-EITI phase, see 




5.1  Main results 
Using the SCM to build the counterfactual unit, the analysis relied on the 
donor pool of countries that did not receive the EITI intervention. One 
hundred thirteen countries around the world with data available obtained a set 
of weights that were averaged to estimate the synthetic unit that best resembles 
each treated country: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. The SCM permits us to appreciate the countries that contribute with a 
greater proportion to the weighted average comparison unit, whose weights in 
combination sum to one (Abadie et al. 2010). This process was repeated for 
each corruption outcome variable  so that the synthetic unit can adapt to the 
different trajectories. Appendix 3 contains the units of the donor pool that 
affected most to the generation of the counterfactual unit, per corruption 
outcome variable and country. It is important to mention that according to 
Abadie et al. (2015) the comparison units should approach the synthetic of our 
study unit without the intervention (to avoid for interpolation) so that the 
donor pool could be restricted to the units motivated by the same structural 
process of the country of our interest. Hence, this study tested the SCM with a 
restricted donor pool of 16 non-EITI Latin American countries. Nevertheless, 
the goodness of fit reduced between the counterfactual and the treated unit 
due to the limited number of countries of the donor Latin American pool. 
Therefore, the sample of non-EITI countries relies on the whole world.  
With the purpose to evaluate the fit of the counterfactual unit, the SCM 
allows us to visually appreciate in each graph the similitude of the pre-
treatment outcomes for the treated  and the synthetic unit . These results 
inferred from the observed  and unobserved variables  demonstrate the 
capacity of the synthetic unit to forecast the behavior that the treated country 
would have had without the intervention over time. Moreover, in the results of 
the method, it is possible to see that the weights per predictor variable are 
alike, which show us the resemblance between the treated and the 
counterfactual, a sign to validate the significance of the estimated outcome of 
the synthetic unit. In the graphs obtained for each country (see Section 5.3 and 
Appendix 5), it is evident that the pre-EITI treated and synthetic units follow 
the same course until the year of ‘commitment’, or in some cases, the course 
changes nearly before to the point of intervention.  
Subsequently, with the performance of the inference method, we obtain 
the ‘in place’ placebo effects or falsification exercises that produces statistical 
significance. Here, the method provides the ‘change in gap size’ (Appendix 4) 
average for each year of the post-intervention period (different EITI stages for 
each country) with their statistical significance or p-values for each of the three 
inference methods (NRDS, RS(n), and ANRDS). The findings show more 
statistical significance for the Adjusted Non-Restricted Donor Sample method 
(ANRDS), which supports the arguments of Villar and Papyrakis (2016). When 
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applying the NRDS, the placebo gaps distributions can range far from the 
average donor (gap) outcome, so the fit of these synthetic units distorts the 
estimations creating too conservative p-values. Hence, the other alternative 
could be implemented in the donor pool. Nevertheless, when introducing the 
restricted method RS(2) the results can produce limited synthetic estimates 
gaps with also conservative p-values; thus, contradicting the results obtained in 
the adjusted or standardized p-values. With this regard, the informative p-
values presented for each country in a graphical representation are the 
ANRDS.  
5.2 Synthesis of findings 
The results obtained for the five studied countries are diverse and do not have 
general trend patterns. However, it is possible to find some common behaviors 
retrieved from Table 2. Regarding the statistical significance reported by the 
informative Adjusted Non-Restricted Donor Sample method (ANRDS), some 
conclusions can be drawn.  After the EITI intervention, the Control of Corruption 
Index for Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru does not deviate 
statistically significant from the synthetic unit in any of the EITI stages. This 
means there is no effect of the EITI on this corruption perception index that 
captures the overall view of corruption in these countries. Moreover, for these 
four countries, the analysis on the Regime Corruption Index does not show a 
statistically significant effect on the stage of ‘commitment’, which would tell us 
that the EITI’s impact would not appear at this level.  
Concerning the statistically significant effects, this research found that the 
treated Regime Corruption Index (which exposes corruption at the political level) 
is larger (i.e. increase in corruption) than the counterfactual for the cases of 
Guatemala, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago in the ‘candidate’ stage. This index 
for Guatemala and Peru also reproduces a positive effect on the stage of 
‘compliant’, while for Trinidad and Tobago in the stage of ‘commitment’. On 
the other hand, the evaluation of the Regime Corruption Index for Peru (after 
2015) and Trinidad and Tobago indicates a decrease in corruption compared to 
their synthetic in the stage of ‘compliant’.  
Finally, regarding the effect on the Public Sector Corruption Index, only 
Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago have larger and statistically significant 
results in relation to the synthetic in the ‘commitment’ stage. Colombia further 
has the same effect on the ‘candidate’ stage. Contrary, the Trinidad and 
Tobago intervened unit has an average annual decrease effect in the ‘candidate’ 
and ‘compliant’ stages. All of these changes in gap size are of small magnitude, 
with ups and downs in different stages. The effect of the EITI on Honduras is 
not statistically significant nor for any outcome variable neither at any stage. 
Meanwhile, for Trinidad and Tobago, all the ANRDS are statistically 




General view of the trajectory of the outcome variables after the placebo tests  




Control of Corruption Index  
Commitment  2013 + 
Candidate 2014 - 2017 + 
Regime Corruption Index 
Commitment  2013 + 
Candidate 2014 - 2017 + 
Public Sector Corruption Index 
Commitment  2013      +*** 
Candidate 2014 - 2017    +** 
Guatemala 
Control of Corruption Index  
Commitment  2010  - 
Candidate 2011 - 2013  -  
Compliant 2014 - 2017  + 
Regime Corruption Index 
Commitment  2010  + 
Candidate 2011 - 2013   +* 
Compliant 2014 - 2017   +* 
Public Sector Corruption Index 
Commitment  2010  + 
Candidate 2011 - 2013  - 
Compliant 2014 - 2017  - 
Honduras 
Control of Corruption Index  
Commitment  2012  + 
Candidate 2013 - 2017  - 
Regime Corruption Index 
Commitment  2012  - 
Candidate 2013 - 2017  + 
Public Sector Corruption Index 
Commitment  2012  + 
Candidate 2013 - 2017  + 
Peru 
Control of Corruption Index  
Commitment  2005 - 2006  + 
Candidate 2007 - 2011 - 
Compliant 2012 - 2017  + 
Regime Corruption Index 
Commitment  2005 - 2006  + 
Candidate 2007 - 2011    +* 
Compliant  2012 - 2017     +/-* 
Public Sector Corruption Index 
Commitment  2005 - 2006  + 
Candidate 2007 - 2011  + 
Compliant  2012 - 2017  + 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Control of Corruption Index  
Commitment 2010  +* 
Candidate 2011 - 2014  +* 
Compliant 2015 - 2017  +* 
Regime Corruption Index 
Commitment 2010      +*** 
Candidate 2011 - 2014  +* 
Compliant 2015 - 2017    -** 
Public Sector Corruption Index 
Commitment 2010  +* 
Candidate 2011 - 2014  -** 
Compliant 2015 - 2017  -** 
  
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Given the information described above, the impact of the EITI in Latin 
America has mixed results. There are ups and downs and in most of the cases 
where the index of corruption is larger than the synthetic, it coincides with 
events of corruption in the extractive sector. Specifications of the cases of 
Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras can be seen in Appendix 5. With the 
purpose to have a deeper view of the results, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago 
will be explained more in detail in the next section. These latter two countries, 
unlike the others, are more dependent on the extractive industry. Thus, the 
events of the extractive sector can be more prominent in the public opinion, 
especially in terms of political corruption reflected in the Regime Corruption 
Index, which p-values are statistically significant for both countries. Trinidad 
and Tobago also obtained statistical significance for the outcome variables 
Control of Corruption Index and Public Sector Corruption Index. However, since there 
is more evidence available for corruption scandals at the political level, more  
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emphasis will be given to the Regime Corruption Index of Peru and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Furthermore, a short profile of each country is presented before the 
analysis of the results.  
5.3 Analysis of Peru and Trinidad and Tobago 
Peru 
Peru is the first country in the region to have implemented the EITI. This is a 
country rich in natural resources, whose extractive industry accounts around 
13% of its GDP. It mainly extracts oil, gas, and minerals, being the second-
largest producer of copper, silver, and zinc around the world (EITI Peru 2016). 
Similar to Guatemala, and as mentioned in the theory of the resource curse 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Collier et al. 2009) the mining activity has brought 
conflicts to Peru, around 80% of the conflict is due to mining sector. 
Regarding corruption in this country, it can be highlighted that bribery and 
embezzlement of public funds have been more prominent in the public sphere 
since the occurrence of Fujimori’s presidential corruption scandal in 2000, 
which dissipated over time. Moreover, like in other Latin American countries, 
the corruption in Peru is widespread, although anti-corruption plans have been 
implemented over time. For instance, from 2012-2016, Peru introduced a 
National Plan to Fight Corruption (Figaredo 2018). 
With this background, the EITI mechanism for Peru was a tool to address 
key concerns of the communities with a closer relation to the mineral 
commodities, who tend to end up involved in conflicts. Furthermore, the 
generalized corruption, as depicted in Figure 4 from 0 to 0.5 points (similar 
levels to Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago) in the Control of Corruption Index, 
Figure 4 




Source: Author’s estimation  
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led the government to join the EITI. Therefore, in 2005 Peru officially 
committed to the EITI, the ‘candidate’ stage was obtained two years later 
(2007) and became ‘compliant’ in 2012 (Figure 4). To date, it has presented five 
EITI reports with payments, conciliation information, minutes, etc. The 
Peruvian case was a pilot experience in the region, it has been through some 
ups and downs in the process (EITI Peru 2016). The following figures give us 
an overview of Peru’s EITI implementation process. 
Figure 5 
Regime Corruption Index of Peru and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Figure 6 
Public Sector Corruption Index of Peru and Adjusted P-Values 
  




As we can see, the levels of corruption of the variables Control of Corruption 
Index and Public Sector Corruption Index for the treated unit do not change over 
time with regard to the synthetic Peru. This contradicts the results of Etter 
(2012), where he found that corruption, as an obstacle to business operations, 
decreased after the EITI introduction. Figures 4 and 6 show that the synthetic 
unit (dotted line) is quite similar to the treated unit in every stage of the EITI 
implementation. The corruption indices of the treated Peru slightly fluctuate 
over the synthetic units in these two outcome variables, not showing an 
important change. This is confirmed by the placebo tests where the ANRDS 
are not statistically significant. For instance, after the ‘compliant’ stage, when 
the new plan anti-corruption was implemented, the Control of Corruption Index 
and the Public Sector Corruption Index marginally deviates, but not at a statistically 
significant level. These findings are in line with the view of Figaredo (2018) 
who mentions that corruption in Peru does not improve with the pass of time 
even with the implementation of the anti-corruption plan. She mentions that 
anti-corruption initiatives have long-term effects. However, her explanation 
cannot be supported by our analysis given that the EITI has more than 10 
years in Peru by now.  
On the other hand, Peru’s Regime Corruption Index — Figure 5 — fluctuates 
after the post-treatment. In general, this index is higher for the treated than for 
the synthetic Peru, but of small magnitude (0.038 annual average change 
obtained from Appendix 4 between 2006 and 2014), statistically significant at 
the 10% confidence level. Considering that this index is the perception of 
corruption committed by politicians (high positions), it can be influenced by 
the constant corrupt scandals in the extractive sector. These corrupt practices 
would produce a negative influence on the public opinion and suggest a weak 
EITI intervention, undermining also the measures taken by the EITI in the 
sector. Some corrupt cases are related to the state-owned oil company 
‘PETROPERU’. In 2005, it was involved in the Modernization Project of the 
Refinery called ‘Talara’, which was questioned during the next four year 
because of its manager’s record, its continuous increase in price —almost four 
times the original price—, as well as the lack of transparency in the concession 
process (Manco 2010). Afterward, in 2008 there was a prominent case that 
lasted for about 3 years in the public sphere called ‘Petroaudios’. Here, some 
audios were revealed with declarations of paying bribes to employees of 
PETROPERU to favor the Norwegian Discover Petroleum company to get 
exploration contracts of submarine oil blocks and gas fields (De Cuello Blanco 
2012).  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Peru is also characterized 
by having serious problems of conflicts where the mining activity is present. 
However, the conflict is not the only problem in the mining activity but it is 
the lack of transparency. Hence, the mechanism of the EITI to include civil 
society participation to work toward a well-functioning of the extractive sector, 
as well as the wellbeing of communities, might not be properly addressed. 
Some controversial cases that have been broadcasted are ‘Antamina’, ‘Tintaya’ 
and ‘Camisea’, most issues of these mining companies are related to 
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environmental and economic matters. In 2012, Antamina caused a rupture of 
the mineral pipeline that affected the nearby populations and the rivers. 
Moreover, this company was involved in illegal land transactions and unfair 
reallocation of the communities. In 2013, Antamina has also been suspected of 
collusion in a region highly vulnerable to corrupt practices due to mining 
activity (Quispe et al. 2018). Tintaya, also in 2012, provoked riots and a 
declaration of ‘state of emergency’ due to the expansion of its mining 
operations. Meanwhile, Camisea – a hydrocarbon project- between 2005 and 
2009 was questioned because the company negotiated with Mexico larger 
exports of gas which left short-handed to the national demand. This was an 
irregular modification of the contract that this company had with the Peruvian 
government. Thus, the company was criticized by the irregular economic 
activity of its exports (Sanborn and Dammert 2013).  
The cases presented above have been timely revealed. However, while the 
EITI was operating, another case of corruption, namely the ‘Odebrecht’ 
scandal, was taking place, only discovered until 2016. The Odebrecht company 
paid about USD 29 million in bribes to Peruvian public officials between 2005 
and 2014 with the purpose to obtain several contracts that added up to USD 
12.5 billion (Faiola 2018). The largest amount of money in contracts with this 
company is led by the Ministry of Mining and Energy in 2014, two projects 
valued at more than 6 billion —a gas pipeline and a hydroelectric power station 
in the south and center of Peru respectively (IDL Reporteros 2016). In this 
sense, it is evident that the transparency policy of the EITI is limited to deter 
corruption cases. A timeline illustrates these events in Figure 7 that coincide 
with the results of the SCM (increased corruption) for the Regime Corruption 
Index. 
Figure 7 
Corruption Milestones of Peru 
2005
2008 2011 2014
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On the other hand, particularly between 2015 and 2017, the Regime 
Corruption Index for the treated Peru is smaller than the counterfactual unit, an 
average annual change in gap of – 0.07 points, meaning a decrease in 
corruption. During those years, it can be highlighted some actions taken by the 
Peruvian government, such as the publication of two EITI reports which 
emphasize extensive civil participation (EITI Peru 2016). Also, in 2016, the 
government brought to light the achievements obtained from its Plan Anti-
Corruption 2012-2016, like the creation of a digital platform and the 
implementation of conferences and workshops (Figaredo 2018). Likewise, at 
that time, the investigation of corruption cases increased by 60%, most of 
them related to Odebrecht that worked closely with the extractive sector and 
where key officials were sent to jail (Gestion 2017). With these measures, the 
government tried to show its effort to fight corruption, which could have 
positively influenced the public opinion regarding the perception of corruption 
at the political level.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The extractive sector in Trinidad and Tobago represents 32.2% of its GDP 
and 77% of its exports. If we compare to the other Latin American countries, 
Trinidad and Tobago is more dependent on the revenues of this sector. The 
country’s main exports are oil and liquefied natural gas, followed by mineral 
activities (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2016).  The levels of corruption of this 
country are displayed in Figure 8 for the Control of Corruption Index. This 
indicator fluctuates from 0 to 0.5 points over the last fifteen years, levels 
comparable to Peru and Colombia. According to the World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report (Global Security 2017), corruption is the 
second-most problematic issue for doing business in the country. Common 
nepotism cases, police abuse of power, bribe to facilitate drug, weapons, and 
human smuggling and trafficking have been reported in the country. Moreover, 
this country is a transit port for moving drugs. It is also reported money 
laundering proceeding from drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, fraud, tax 
evasion, and public corruption (Global Security 2017). 
Under this panorama and given the historical compromise of joining the 
EITI in the first EITI Plenary Conference in London, 2003, the government 
of Trinidad and Tobago started the public commitment phase in 2010. One 
year later in 2011, it was granted the ‘candidate’ status. Then, in 2015, Trinidad 
and Tobago obtained the compliance status, which according to the multi-
stakeholders was planned for 2014. During the process, this country presented 
six EITI reports with their due conciliations (companies’ declared tax and 
other payments). Nevertheless, the main problem encountered was the 
disclosure of information from the enterprises because discretion to divulge 
tax data was protected by the law. Thus, the government has had to find a way 
to encourage them to present the information by the signature of an 
agreement, which in the end caused some delays in the reports. In 2014 and 
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2015, the government started to populate the data in order to spread the 
benefits of the EITI and transparency (EITI Trinidad and Tobago 2016). The 
effects and the process of the EITI implementation can be appreciated in the 
next figures.  
Figure 8 
Control of Corruption Index of Trinidad and Tobago and Adjusted P-Values 
  
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Figure 9 
Regime Corruption Index of Trinidad and Tobago and Adjusted P-Values 
  





Public Sector Corruption Index of Trinidad and Tobago and Adjusted P-Values 
  
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Contrary to the results found in the other Latin American countries of this 
research, Trinidad and Tobago presents results that are statistically significant 
in almost every stage of the three outcome corruption variables. For the Control 
of Corruption Index (Figure 8), the trajectory of corruption of Trinidad and 
Tobago starts to rise compared to the synthetic Trinidad and Tobago after the 
EITI intervention. That is, in the ‘commitment’ stage (2010) the change in gap 
size is 0.13 points (statistically significant at the 5% confidence level) and 
between the ‘candidate’ and ‘compliant’ stages (2011-2017), there is a 0.23 
average annual increase (statistically significant at the 10 % confidence level). 
Moreover, the evaluation for Trinidad and Tobago’s Regime Corruption Index 
(Figure 9) confirms this increase after the adoption of the EITI. In the 
‘commitment’, ‘candidate’, and ‘compliant’ stages, from 2010 until 2015, the 
index for the treated unit slightly deviates by 0.053 points (average annual 
increase) from the counterfactual unit, statistically significant at the 10 % 
confidence level. Nevertheless, for the years 2016 and 2017 after the 
‘compliant’ stage, on average the corruption outcome is smaller by - 0.05 
compared to the synthetic index, with a 5 % confidence level.  
In general terms, the graphical representations of the Control of Corruption 
Index and Regime Corruption Index demonstrate that the EITI implementation 
has not influenced the decrease of corruption perception. The results for these 
two indices, instead, imply higher corruption for the treated Trinidad and 
Tobago compared to its counterfactual. This situation can also be connected to 
scandals of corruption in the extractive sector, which are in detriment to the 
EITI performance. This would also suggest that the EITI mechanism of 
transparency has not been enough to counter corruption. Besides that, during 
the period of the EITI intervention, the Trinidad and Tobago’s government 
started to raise its expenditure thanks to the increased commodity prices, 
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which was an open door for corrupt practices, especially in the energy sector. 
The most prominent case is that of ‘Petrochin’, a state-owned company 
involved in overpricing and embezzlement of public funds for several years. 
This company together with World GTL (a private company that produces 
Gas-To-Liquids - GTL diesel fuels) started a joint venture to build a Gas-To-
Liquids plant since 2005 that had to be functioning by 2009. However, this 
plant was not ready at that time and its construction price rose to more than 
twice the budget approved in the first instance. This project was late regarding 
the delivery deadline and the World GTL stopped financing it. Thus, the 
project was cataloged as receivership and, one year later, with the new 
government, it was suspended. In 2012, the plant that cost about US$399 
million was sold to a private company for just US$35 million. The public 
opinion considered a case of corruption for its overpricing, deviation of public 
funds, and for its insignificant sale price (Guardian 2018).  
In addition to that, in 2010 Calder Hart —former executive chairman of 
the public company Urban Development Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago 
(UDeCOTT)— fled to the United States of America because some documents 
linked him with corruption allegations. He was in charge of the construction of 
numerous government projects that add up to $820 million (Guardian 2012). 
These corrupt events, together with the failure of one member of the president 
Manning’s party to declare a London Bank account to the Integrity 
Commission, lead the country to opt for a new ruling party in the presidency 
(Coha 2010). Nevertheless, the new government could not deal with 
corruption and it was also involved in scandals. Employees of the Ministry of 
Energy (in charge of the oil, gas and minerals sectors) were using their 
positions for private gain. Hence, in 2015, the new Minister of Energy found a 
drop of the revenues not because of a decline in production, but due to ‘tax 
leakage’ in the energy sector (Guyana Times 2018). Furthermore, in the same 
year, the Ministry of Energy fired ‘Super Industrial Services’ —a favored 
company from the previous government— because it did not accomplish 
several contracts of construction, e.g. a water treatment plant. The owners of 
this company bribed public employees, misused public funds by failing to carry 
out the contracts, and fled from the country (Global Security 2017). These 
scandals of corruption could be to some extent the reasons why corruption has 
been increasing instead of decreasing. The effects that the EITI could have had 
on corruption perception must have been mitigated for the constant corrupt 
acts of this country. A timeline of these corrupt practices that concur with the 
increase in corruption for the Regime Corruption Index after the EITI 
intervention can be appreciated in Figure 11. 
On the other hand, exceptionally, Trinidad and Tobago’s Public Sector 
Corruption Index (Figure 10) starts to decrease two years after the ‘candidate’ 
stage. From 2013 until 2014 the annual average change in gap size is - 0.05 
points, which p-values are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
While for the ‘compliant’ status, from 2015 until 2017, the deviation of the 
treated unit is on an annual average -0.07, at the 1% confidence level. This 
special result could be explained by the measures taken to approach the civil  
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society, such as the television and radio shows implemented since 2013. In 
these spaces, two EITI reports were also published showing the population 
that the government was applying measures to fight corruption (EITI Trinidad 
and Tobago 2016). 
Figure 10 
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The concerns about corruption and economic growth in resource-rich 
countries, deeply analyzed in the resource curse theory, have brought to the 
international arena the necessity to create initiatives that promote good 
governance, transparency, and accountability. The EITI, shaped under these 
principles, has attracted several countries around the world. As this initiative 
has become widespread, numerous studies have been performed to investigate 
the EITI’s impact on institutional and economic variables. Regarding 
corruption, since the inception of this scheme, the qualitative and quantitative 
methods applied have focused on the effect of the EITI on the whole sample 
of EITI countries and few on individual case studies. Above all, none of them 
have paid attention to the cases of the same region, considering the similarities 
that countries in the same zone can have. With this precept, this research 
contributed to the literature by showing comparative outcomes in Latin 
American countries in every stage of the EITI intervention for the period 
2002-2017. In general, the results are mixed. Nevertheless, with a broad 
perspective, it could be said that the EITI mostly has not affected the 
reduction of corruption perception in Latin America. The effects of the EITI 
are marginal, moving up and down without a defined pattern. In the majority 
of the cases, the informative standardized p-values do not show a statistical 
significance and, in the cases where there is significance, the corruption for the 
treated unit tends to be higher than for the synthetic one.   
 More in detail, the change in the gap size between the treated and the 
synthetic Control of Corruption Index does not have statistical significance in any 
stage of the EITI implementation for the countries included in this research, 
apart from Trinidad and Tobago where the corruption indices for the 
intervened unit are larger in almost every phase. A similar situation is reflected 
in the Public Sector Corruption Index which results show statistical significance for 
only Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. In the stage of ‘commitment’ for 
both of these countries, the intervened unit deviates positively from the 
counterfactual, i.e. an increase in corruption. Whilst in the stages of ‘candidate’ 
and ‘compliant’, there is an opposite effect in Trinidad and Tobago, i.e. a 
decrease in corruption. The majority of the statistically significant effects are 
seen in the Regime Corruption Index that exposes corruption at the political level. 
This index of corruption for Guatemala, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago is 
higher in the ‘candidate’ stage, while it is smaller for Peru (after 2015) and 
Trinidad and Tobago in the ‘compliant’ stage. These fluctuations across 
different stages are, nevertheless, of small magnitude. In most of the cases 
where corruption increases, there is a coincidence with scandals of corruption 
or conflict in the extractive sector, which diminish the performance of the 
EITI per se. Such is the case of Trinidad and Tobago that, in 2015, public 





Moreover, it is important to mention that the results can be limited 
because corruption perception indices do not only measure corruption of the 
extractive industries but of every sector. In some cases, the mineral revenues 
represent a small percentage of GDP, like in Guatemala and Honduras, where 
the introduction of the EITI that only targets the extractive sector would not 
have a significant impact on the national opinion. Besides that, the EITI 
focuses on transparency which might not have an immediate effect on 
corruption, or these concepts would not be associated as consequents in 
popular perception. Hence, this would limit the effects on corruption 
perception measures. Even though in our case studies (such as Peru) the EITI 
has been operating for many years, the effects of the scheme cannot be 
perceived as a reduction in corruption.  
 The EITI alone is just one factor that contributes to mitigating 
corruption, limited to the extractive sector. Therefore, its policy of 
transparency can be perceived as narrowed. The fight against corruption 
requires the implementation of complementary measures at the national level 
in every sector, such as anti-corruption plans with technological innovations 
that allow people from remote parts of a country to report corrupt acts. 
Furthermore, governments have to guarantee civil society participation, a key 
component to improve transparency, accountability, and policy formulations 
concerning corruption. This study has found that civil society participation has 
been restricted, like in the case of Guatemala, which also hampers EITI’s 
benefits. Hence, it is imperative to apply comprehensive transparency tools 
that enhance institutions and assure citizens’ participation to prevent the 
resource curse. Dykstra (2011), Aaronson (2011), Kasekende et al. (2016), 
Lujala et al. (2017), and Ogë (2016) also mention similar limitations and 
measures to be considered by the governments besides the EITI.  
 Finally, the results from the SCM along with the corrupt cases 
presented in this research show that the EITI, as a transparency mechanism, 
has failed to reduce corruption in Latin American countries. While the EITI 
was working, corrupt practices were taking place as well. In this regard, there is 
a need to review the scope of the EITI, which focus should be broadened to 
address the failures detected during its intervention. Additionally, to support or 
reject this postulate of the EITI effectiveness on corruption, further individual 
case studies should be conducted in other regions of the world that also share 
similar backgrounds. Besides that, it should be considered the importance and 
magnitude of the extractive sector in the economy of the countries evaluated. 
This could make the difference at the moment of using macro indices that do 
not measure transparency solely in the extractive sector. It would be useful for 
these kinds of studies to develop indices that specifically measure corruption in 
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Appendix 2: Data description 
Variable Name Description Source 
Outcome Variables     
Regime corruption 
The extent to which political actors use political office for private or political gain. 
If focuses on specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a set 
of corrupt acts that relate neopatrimonial rule (higher scores = more regime 
corruption). Scale 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
Public sector corruption  
The extent to which public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, 
kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often they steal, embezzle, or 
misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use 
(from less corrupt to more corrupt). Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
Control of Corruption 
It defines the exercise of public power for private gain. It includes additional 
payments to get things done, corruption on the business environment, "grand 
corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in 
"state 
capture". Scale - 2.5 (less corrupt) to 2.5 (highest corruption). Indicator inverted for 
equivalence with the other indicators of corruption. 
WGI 
Predictor Economic Variables   
Log of GDP GDP logged to limit large numbers (current US$) World Bank 
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) World Bank 
Log of GDP per capita  GDP per capita logged to limit large numbers (current US$) World Bank 
Trade*  
Trade (% of GDP). Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
World Bank 
Mineral rents 





    
Log of Population Total Population logged to limit large numbers World Bank 
Birth rate 
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people). Number of live births occurring during the 
year, per 1,000 population estimated 
World Bank 
Death rate 
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people). Number of deaths occurring during the year, 
per 1,000 population estimated. 
World Bank 
Basic drinking water 
services 
People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population).  World Bank 
Basic sanitation services People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) World Bank 
Access to electricity Access to electricity (% of population) World Bank 
Adolescent fertility rate  Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) World Bank 
Life expectancy at birth, 
female 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years). The number of years a new-born infant 
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth  
World Bank 
Life expectancy at birth, 
male 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years). The number of years a new-born infant 
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth. 
World Bank 
Mortality rate, infant 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births). Number of deaths of infants under one 




Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+ (modelled ILO 
estimate) 
Proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active. 
World Bank 
Unemployment 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modelled ILO estimate). Share of 
the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
World Bank 
Vulnerable employment Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) (modelled ILO estimate) World Bank 
Employment to 
population ratio, female 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) (modelled ILO estimate). 
Proportion of a country's population of female that is employed. 
World Bank 
Employment to 
population ratio, male 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, male (%) (modelled ILO estimate). 





Employers, female (% of female employment) (modelled ILO estimate).  
Female workers on their own account or with one or a few partners. 
World Bank 
Male employers 
Employers, male (% of male employment) (modelled ILO estimate).  
Male workers on their own account or with one or a few partners. 
World Bank 
Predictor Governance and Transparency Variables  
Regulatory Quality 
It includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies.  




It captures aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. 
Percentile Rank: 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) 
WGI 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism.  
Scale: -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
WGI 
Rule of Law 
It gauges the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  
Scale: -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
WGI 
Predictor Political Liberties Variables  
Freedom of expression 
The extent to which the government respect press and media freedom, the 
freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public 
sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression.  
Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
Civil liberties 




It captures the government attempt to repress civil society organizations.  
Scale: from least democratic ”-3.22” to most democratic "3.37" 
V-Dem 
Electoral democracy 
It measures to what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense 
achieved—liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.  
Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
Political civil liberties  
It includes freedom of association and freedom of expression, relevant for political 
competition and accountability. 
 Scale: 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) 
V-Dem 
* No used in Trinidad and Tobago due to absence of information 




Appendix 3: Donor Pool Countries and Weights by 
Corruption Outcome Indicator per Each Country 






























Algeria 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Angola 0 0 0.005 0 0.018 0 0 0 0 
Australia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 0 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 0.207 0.102 0 
Barbados 0.006 0 0.009 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0.020 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Benin 0 0 0.020 0 0.004 0.168 0 0 0 
Bhutan 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 0.007 0 0.009 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0.004 0.029 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 0 0.044 0.003 0 0.045 0.012 0 0.004 0 
Cabo Verde 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0.005 0 0.008 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Comoros 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0.017 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0.213 0.005 0 0.001 0 0 0.037 0 
Cuba 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0.220 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 0.009 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 0 0.004 0 0.006 0 0 0 0.380 
El Salvador 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0.005 0 0.053 0 0 0.197 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Eswatini 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Fiji 0.135 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Gabon 0 0 0.006 0 0.005 0 0 0 0 
Gambia, The 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0.024 0.14 0.004 0 0.100 0.105 0.187 0.005 0 
Greece 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0.003 0 0.009 0.693 0 0.156 0.040 
Haiti 0 0 0.004 0.050 0.011 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0.118 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Israel 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Jamaica 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 0.124 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 0 0.012 0.007 0 0.004 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 0 0 0.009 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Lao PDR 0 0 0.006 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0.116 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0 0 0.009 0.443 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.001 
Libya 0 0 0.017 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0.332 
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Lithuania 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0.011 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Maldives 0 0 0.006 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius 0 0 0.009 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0.109 0 0.003 0 0.032 0.142 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0.017 0 0.003 0 0 0 0.026 
Morocco 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 0 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0.237 0.014 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
North Macedonia 0 0 0.015 0.062 0.023 0 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0.006 0.013 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 0 0 0.002 0 0.029 0 0 0 0.015 
Panama 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0.006 0.207 0.002 0.022 0 0 0.072 
Poland 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 0 0 0.007 0.039 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.031 
Russian Federation 0 0 0.009 0 0.003 0 0.126 0 0 
Rwanda 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0.007 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 0.007 0 0.008 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0.254 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0.010 0 0.012 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0 0.004 0 0.004 0 0.089 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0.007 0 0.017 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0.114 0.002 0 0.003 0 0 0.052 0 
Turkey 0 0 0.005 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0.071 0 0.462 0 0 0.305 0.101 
Uganda 0 0 0.005 0 0.003 0 0 0 0 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0.006 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0.007 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0.003 0 0.008 0 0 0 0.002 
Vanuatu 0.020 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela, RB 0.306 0 0.004 0 0.006 0 0.240 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0.007 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 
West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0.010 0.187 0.001 0 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0.006 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 
n/a corresponds to countries dropped because of lack of information in the pre-intervention period. 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
 





















Algeria 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Angola 0.001 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Australia 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.053 
Austria 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.007 
Bahrain 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.004 
Bangladesh 0 0.010 0.016 0.032 0.001 0.002 
Barbados 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.008 
Belarus 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.012 
Belgium 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.029 
Benin 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.004 
Bhutan 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.034 0.016 
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Bolivia 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Botswana 0.194 0.009 0.008 0.108 0.002 0.005 
Brazil 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Bulgaria 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.006 
Burundi 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.001 
Cabo Verde 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Cambodia 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.119 0.001 0.003 
Canada 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.012 
Chile 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.012 
China 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Comoros 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Costa Rica 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.007 
Croatia 0.003 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.003 
Cuba 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Cyprus 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Czech Republic 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.079 0.005 
Denmark 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.147 0.065 
Ecuador 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.003 0.010 0.015 0.005 0.001 0.002 
El Salvador 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.003 
Equatorial Guinea n/a n/a n/a 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Eritrea 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Estonia 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.009 
Eswatini 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Fiji 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Finland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.015 0.017 
France 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.016 
Gabon 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.021 0.001 0.003 
Gambia, The 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.001 0.003 
Georgia 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Greece 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Guinea-Bissau 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Haiti 0 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Hungary 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.008 
Iceland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.01 0.047 
India 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Ireland 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.003 0 0.017 
Israel 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.007 
Italy n/a n/a n/a 0.002 0.025 0.005 
Jamaica 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.006 
Japan 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.026 
Jordan 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Kenya 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Korea, Rep. 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.124 0.002 0.009 
Kuwait 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.004 
Lao PDR 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Latvia 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.199 0.007 
Lebanon 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.101 0.002 0.003 
Lesotho n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.002 
Libya n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Lithuania 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.057 0.038 0.006 
Luxembourg 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.014 0.017 
Malaysia 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.004 
Maldives n/a n/a n/a 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Malta 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.006 
Mauritius 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.005 
Moldova 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Montenegro n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.013 
Morocco 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.003 
Namibia 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Nepal 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Netherlands 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.017 
New Zealand 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.037 0.045 
Nicaragua 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.003 
North Macedonia 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.008 
Oman n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Pakistan 0.516 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Panama 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Paraguay 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Poland n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.004 0.006 
67 
 
Portugal 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.007 
Qatar 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Romania n/a n/a n/a 0.003 0.001 0.004 
Russian Federation 0.003 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Rwanda 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.005 
Saudi Arabia n/a n/a n/a 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Serbia 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Singapore 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.022 0.08 
Slovak Republic 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Slovenia 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.01 
South Africa 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Spain 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.018 0.02 
Sri Lanka 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Sudan 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.003 
Sweden 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.076 0.065 
Switzerland 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.029 0.026 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Thailand 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.083 0.001 0.003 
Tunisia 0.003 0.010 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Turkey 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Turkmenistan 0.001 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.003 
Uganda 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 
United Arab Emirates 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Uruguay 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.021 0.008 
Uzbekistan 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Vanuatu 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.004 
Venezuela, RB 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Vietnam 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.003 
West Bank and Gaza 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.016 
Zimbabwe 0.002 0.010 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.003 
n/a corresponds to countries dropped because of lack of information in the pre-intervention period. 
Source: Author’s estimation 
 
Appendix 4: Placebo results 
Values obtained after the placebo tests  
Country Dependent 
variable 
Stage Year Annual 
change 
NRDS ANRDS RS(2) 
Colombia Control of 
Corruption 
Index 
Commitment 2013 0.03 0.76 0.23 0.62 
Candidate 2014 0.04 0.87 0.41 0.81 
2015 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2016 0.05 0.80 0.42 0.81 




Commitment 2013 0.01 0.74 0.61 0.63 
Candidate 2014 0.00 0.93 0.85 0.93 
2015 0.05 0.40 0.42 0.20 
2016 0.05 0.46 0.44 0.31 




Commitment 2013 0.08 0.20 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Candidate 2014 0.08 0.22 0.00*** 0.00*** 
2015 0.07 0.26 0.00*** 0.00*** 
2016 0.01 0.73 0.06* 1.00 
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2017 0.05 0.43 0.03** 0.33 
Guatemala Control of 
Corruption 
Index 
Commitment 2010 -0.03 0.71 0.75 0.66 
Candidate 2011 -0.13 0.29 0.40 0.24 
2012 0.03 0.87 0.88 0.86 
2013 -0.06 0.83 0.78 0.81 
Compliant 2014 0.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 
2015 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.93 
2016 0.09 0.70 0.73 0.70 




Commitment 2010 0.00 0.92 0.32 0.94 
Candidate 2011 0.00 0.89 0.28 0.94 
2012 -0.02 0.46 0.13 0.44 
2013 0.10 0.20 0.06* 0.28 
Compliant 2014 0.09 0.22 0.07* 0.28 
2015 0.09 0.26 0.07* 0.28 
2016 0.03 0.58 0.13 0.61 




Commitment 2010 0.00 0.66 0.90 0.60 
Candidate 2011 -0.01 0.71 0.85 0.67 
2012 -0.01 0.56 0.80 0.49 
2013 -0.06 0.39 0.77 0.33 
Compliant 2014 -0.06 0.39 0.76 0.33 
2015 -0.07 0.24 0.73 0.22 
2016 -0.11 0.15 0.75 0.13 
2017 -0.08 0.29 0.75 0.27 
Honduras Control of 
Corruption 
Index 
Commitment 2012 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.08* 
Candidate 2013 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.18 
2014 0.06 0.79 0.65 0.77 
2015 -0.17 0.44 0.35 0.43 
2016 -0.07 0.76 0.61 0.80 
 




Commitment 2012 -0.07 0.10* 0.41 0.04** 
Candidate 2013 0.02 0.64 0.48 0.54 
2014 0.03 0.56 0.47 0.43 
2015 -0.02 0.71 0.49 0.63 
2016 0.02 0.74 0.50 0.67 
 






Commitment 2012 0.02 0.33 0.58 0.23 
Candidate 2013 0.03 0.46 0.62 0.40 
2014 0.03 0.47 0.62 0.41 
2015 0.03 0.50 0.63 0.46 
2016 0.02 0.62 0.68 0.56 
 
2017 -0.03 0.63 0.65 0.54 
Peru Control of 
Corruption 
Index 
Commitment 2005 0.08 0.52 0.32 0.53 
2006 0.04 0.79 0.52 0.84 
Candidate 2007 0.09 0.64 0.44 0.73 
2008 0.00 0.99 0.77 0.98 
2009 0.01 0.97 0.68 0.98 
2010 -0.06 0.76 0.56 0.75 
2011 -0.07 0.75 0.53 0.75 
Compliant 2012 0.07 0.78 0.54 0.78 
2013 0.18 0.52 0.38 0.49 
2014 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.38 
2015 0.35 0.36 0.29 0.35 
2016 0.16 0.68 0.49 0.65 




Commitment 2005 0.00 0.82 0.27 0.65 
2006 0.06 0.10* 0.03** 0.13 
Candidate 2007 0.06 0.12 0.04** 0.13 
2008 0.02 0.38 0.10* 0.17 
2009 0.02 0.46 0.13 0.39 
2010 0.11 0.12 0.04** 0.09* 
2011 -0.04 0.40 0.10* 0.35 
Compliant 2012 0.03 0.53 0.13 0.52 
2013 0.03 0.52 0.13 0.57 
2014 0.06 0.35 0.10* 0.35 
2015 -0.04 0.45 0.10* 0.39 
2016 -0.10 0.23 0.08* 0.26 




Commitment 2005 0.00 0.66 0.43 0.67 
2006 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.26 
Candidate 2007 0.03 0.32 0.24 0.33 
2008 0.03 0.37 0.25 0.33 
2009 0.03 0.33 0.22 0.35 
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2010 0.03 0.42 0.26 0.44 
2011 -0.05 0.28 0.32 0.28 
Compliant 2012 -0.05 0.32 0.30 0.28 
2013 0.07 0.31 0.31 0.33 
2014 0.07 0.30 0.34 0.30 
2015 -0.03 0.59 0.39 0.60 
2016 -0.03 0.52 0.36 0.58 






Commitment 2010 0.13 0.19 0.04** 0.09* 
Candidate 2011 0.06 0.60 0.09* 0.55 
2012 0.13 0.51 0.09* 0.45 
2013 0.20 0.36 0.07* 0.27 
2014 0.36 0.15 0.04** 0.09* 
Compliant 2015 0.24 0.33 0.04** 0.27 
2016 0.18 0.51 0.06* 0.55 




Commitment 2010 0.08 0.09* 0.01*** 0.25 
Candidate 2011 0.09 0.13 0.01*** 0.25 
2012 0.09 0.13 0.02** 0.00*** 
2013 0.02 0.66 0.10* 0.75 
2014 0.02 0.70 0.10* 0.75 
Compliant 2015 0.02 0.70 0.11 0.75 
2016 -0.05 0.45 0.05** 0.75 




Commitment 2010 0.00 0.61 0.10* 0.67 
Candidate 2011 0.00 0.84 0.24 0.67 
2012 0.00 0.74 0.22 0.56 
2013 -0.05 0.47 0.03** 0.33 
2014 -0.05 0.48 0.03** 0.33 
Compliant 2015 -0.05 0.38 0.03** 0.44 
2016 -0.08 0.24 0.02** 0.11 
2017 -0.08 0.26 0.01*** 0.22 




Appendix 5: Detailed results of Colombia, Guatemala, and   
Honduras  
Colombia 
Colombia is a country characterized by having an abundance of mineral 
resources (petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, 
and hydropower). The extractive sector represented in 2016 around 6.4% of its 
GDP (USD 3.1 billion), which is a reduced percentage compared to the 
previous years. For instance, in 2013 the revenues of this sector contributed to 
7.7% of the GDP. Including in the worsening of these figures are the 
decreasing of foreign direct investment, taxes, and exports. According to the 
Colombian government, this situation is due to the reduction of price levels of 
the raw material of petroleum and mining, the slowdown of the world 
economy, the slower growth in demand from China (main consumer of oil and 
mining products), and the oil oversupply in the world. The main dividends of 
hydrocarbon production come from the state-owned company Ecopetrol 
which also dropped from USD 4.3 billion in 2013 to USD 226 million in 2016. 
Mateus (2012) mentions that resource endowments together with the illegal 
armed conflict keep the threat of corruption in Colombia. Despite the fact that 
Colombia is one of the leading economies in the region with an economic 
growth of 3.1% in the first term of 2019 (Ruiz 2019), the levels of corruption 
have not change over the last 15 years as seen in Figure 12 (the Control of 
Corruption Index has fluctuated between 0.1 and 0.45 —World Governance 
Indicators).  
Concerning this situation, the government of Colombia in 2012 
mentioned that accountability and good governance are important for 
development. Hence, it announced its intention to be more transparent by 
adhering to the EITI, not only to benefit the population but also to give a 
signal to the world the idea that Colombia would take the necessary measures 
to curb corruption. Behind the President’s announcement was the aim to 
facilitate the process of joining the OECD (Mateus 2012), which would 
improve its position in the world14. Moreover, joining the initiative would have 
been attractive to obtain resources from international organizations. Thus, in 
2013 during the 6th EITI Global Conference, Colombia announced its public 
commitment to the initiative; the actions implemented during this stage and 
the following one were supported with funds of international cooperation.15 
 
14 “The OECD is an international forum that aims to promote policies that will 
improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. This 
organization is known as the “rich countries club” by some specialists, even though 
this label is denied by some of its delegates, who see it as just one club for some 
countries” Mateus (2012). 
15 The organizations that contributed to their EITI budget are the Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the 
International and Latin American Foundation for Administration and Policies Public 
(FIIAPP), the World Bank Multi-Donor Fund (FMBM) 
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One year later in 2014 (see Figure 12), Colombia obtained the ‘candidate’ status. 
Since the commitment year until 2017, this country published three EITI 
Reports concerning the fiscal years 2013 to 2016, which encompasses 
corporate tax, royalties, Ecopetrol’s dividends and other taxes (EITI Colombia 
2016). The stages of the EITI implementation in Colombia along with the 
impact on the three corruption outcome variables used can be appreciated in 
the following figures.  
Figure 11 
Control of Corruption Index of Colombia and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Figure 12 
Regime Corruption Index of Colombia and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 





Public Sector Corruption Index of Colombia and Adjusted P-Values 
  
 
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
The three graphs presented above gives us an idea of how the EITI has 
worked in Colombia. As it is possible to see in the post-intervention period, 
for the Control of Corruption Index (Figure 12) and the Regime Corruption Index 
(Figure 13), the synthetic unit does not differ significantly from the treated unit. 
This is confirmed with the p-values that are not even statistically significant at 
the 10% confidence level, which suggests that the EITI has not had any impact 
on these two perception indices. However, for the Public Sector Corruption Index 
(Figure 14), we can appreciate that the synthetic Colombia deviates significantly 
from the treated unit during the ‘commitment’ and ‘candidate’ stages. From 
2013 to 2017, for this corruption outcome, the standardized p-values are all 
statistically significant. For example, in 2013 there is a small magnitude of 0.08 
points change in gap size, larger for the treated (i.e. increase in corruption) 
compared to the synthetic unit, statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level. In general terms, these results tell us the synthetic Colombia is not 
statistically different from the treated Colombia with the EITI intervention, 
except for the Public Sector Corruption Index. This last indicator that is closer to 
the daily life of Colombians (not of a large magnitude) is higher for the treated 
unit. The reasons for these findings could be attributed to the strong discredit 
campaign, faced by the re-elected President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, 
during the 2013 and 2014 presidential elections about corruption cases. Such 
was the case of the consulting ‘PetroTiger’, a company that in 2014 paid bribes 
to a Colombian official from the state-owned oil company ‘Ecopetrol SA’ in 
order to get oil service contracts (Stempel 2019). These events would weaken 
the perception of the EITI performance in this period in terms of increasing 
transparency. In addition to that, Mateus (2012) found that people perceive the 
disclosure of information in the mineral sector is already available in the webs, 
so the EITI mechanism for them would not have any impact on transparency, 
and so on corruption. Therefore, transparency would not the problem in the 
mineral sector, but it is the use and distribution of revenues generated (11% of 
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the Colombian population that dwell in seven out of thirty-two provinces 
received about 80% of the total royalties); allocation problems that were not 
incorporated in the EITI regulations before 2016. Moreover, another 
explanation is that Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in this country could be 
manipulated by powerful groups, including the guerrillas, to diminish the 
performance of the EITI (Mateus 2012).  
 
Guatemala 
Contrary to Colombia, Guatemala relies less on the extractive sector because it 
only represents 2% of its GDP for 2016. The main extractive activity comes 
from the mining sector, being the silver the mineral that contributes with half 
of the royalties of the sector (56%), followed by the production of gold (27%) 
and a smaller proportion the petroleum. Thus, this country is in the 15th rank 
of the largest producers of silver and the 55th rank of producers of gold (World 
Mining Congress 2019). The mineral sector represents 13% of the foreign 
direct investment and 14% of the exports of the country. As mentioned in the 
literature review, mineral endowments can lead to conflict. Guatemala is an 
example of it, where the mining activity has caused social conflicts and, so, 
judicial claims and bills (EITI Guatemala 2013).   
Furthermore, this country also suffers from high levels of corruption (far 
above from the 0.27 points average for Latin America in the Control of 
Corruption Index, Guatemala’s corruption level is between 0.5 and 0.9 points —
Figure 15), where the elites routinely enrich at public expense. Consequently, in 
the search for power, big crime organizations exist in the country. Indeed, large 
parts of the country are under the power of drug lords and crime syndicates. 
This situation has led to mass frustration and huge riots around Guatemala. 
For instance, in 2015, the violent popular demonstrations resulted in the 
resignation and imprisonment of the Guatemalan president after an anti-
corruption investigation of customs fraud (Warf and Stewart 2016).  
With this background, Guatemala has issued some instruments to tackle 
corruption and in 2010 publicly committed to the EITI (see stages in Figure 
15). In the beginning, it relied on international cooperation16 to implement this 
scheme. Therefore, and despite the political elections, they could accomplish 
the candidature stage in less than a year, i.e. 2011. Guatemala has presented 
four EITI reports since 2013, which cover corporate tax, royalties, and other 
taxes. Nevertheless, these reports have to some extent discrepancies about the 
revenue’s flows and the distribution according to the national regulation (the 
National Development Fund has unequally allocated funds to the Guatemalan 
departments). This, the changes in government, and the recovery from internal 
armed conflict of 36 years and an earthquake in 2012 and 2013 have conducted 
the country to various ups and downs during the implementation process 
 
16 The main donors are The World Bank and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, German Corporation for International 
Cooperation GmbH) (EITI Guatemala Report 2016) 
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(EITI Guatemala 2013). Hence, in 2014 it obtained the ‘compliant’ status, but 
in 2015 it was suspended. The following figures show how corruption outcome 
variables have been changing over time compared to their counterfactual.  
Figure 15 
Control of Corruption Index of Guatemala and Adjusted P-Values 
   
Source: Author’s estimation  
Figure 14 
Regime Corruption Index of Guatemala and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 





Public Sector Corruption Index of Guatemala and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Similar to the situation of Colombia, the corruption perception in 
Guatemala post-EITI intervention does not decrease in any of the indicators. 
The synthetic unit is not different from the treated unit for the Control of 
Corruption Index (Figure 15) and Public Sector Corruption Index (Figure 17), 
confirmed by the p-values that show non-statistical significance in any of the 
stages. However, the Regime Corruption Index (Figure 16) for the treated unit is 
higher (i.e. increase in corruption) than for the synthetic Guatemala between 
2013 and 2015. The average annual change for these three years is 0.07 points, 
statistically significant at the10% confidence level. This deviation of the treated 
unit coincides with the event of increasing riots regarding the mining 
concessions. The representative of the communities claimed that the mining 
activity pollutes their homes, and so undermine their human rights, they have 
received threats for protesting against the activity (in 2013 the government 
declared a state of emergency). People disagree with the mineral activity 
because companies receive concessions without considering their wellbeing or 
the international norms about citizens’ consent to let mining operate 
(Movimiento Mesoamericano contra el Modelo Extractivo Minero (M4, Meso-
American Movement Against the Mining Extractive Model) 2014). Hence, it 
would be in detriment to the EITI performance because the transparency that 
EITI promotes is in line with the undesirable extractive sector. In addition to 
that, the generalized perception of corruption was spread due to the destitution 
of the Guatemalan president (2015) for corrupt practices and any relation of 
this government with the EITI work could be assimilated as not transparent. 
Having in mind that this latter indicator is more related to political corruption, 
the increase in corruption in the ‘compliant’ period could be endorsed to these 
events. In the EITI reports (EITI Guatemala 2013), it is mentioned that Civil 
Society Organizations (CSO) that were against the mining sector had a low 
77 
 
involvement in the early stages of the EITI implementation. Moreover, in the 
same report, it is said that people do not know how to participate in the 
mechanism. This would suggest a failure of this international standard to make 
people aware of the importance of transparency. Additionally, there is a limited 
engagement of the companies of the sector in the initiative because of the lack 
of knowledge about the benefits of participating. In a general view, there is no 
evidence of the effect of EITI on reduced corruption in Guatemala (EITI 
Guatemala 2013).  
 
Honduras 
Honduras, together with Guatemala, is part of Central America with a small 
extractive sector. Honduras’ mining sector mainly consists of silver and gold 
(66% of mineral exports), which represents 1% of its GDP and 5% of the 
national exports. Yet, informal mining might be three to four times larger than 
the commercial activities of the sector. There are four mining companies of 
which two have foreign residences, meaning that the real benefits of the 
revenues could not be revealed (EITI Honduras 2013). The levels of 
corruption in Honduras are similar to those of Guatemala, as it is possible to 
see in Figure 18, they range between 0.5 and 1 point in the Control of Corruption 
Index of WGI. According to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal (2016), the 
corruption in Honduras that takes the forms of patronage networks, bribery, 
and clientelism impedes the development of an attractive business investment 
environment. Moreover, the lack of enforcement of anti-corruption 
frameworks and long procedures (opening business and construction permits) 
keep the corruption active and working smoothly. Also, extortion is a frequent 
behavior among police officers and tax officials. In procurement processes, it 
is common to find bribery as a way to obtain contracts and licenses. A related 
case was found and made public in 2014, where the chief of the Honduran 
Institute of Social Security (IHSS) was arrested for embezzlement of public 
funds (overpriced medicine, overpaying for ten ambulances, and money 
laundering through fake enterprises), see The Guardian (2015). There is almost 
no information about the corruption in the mining sector, but it is a branch of 
the other sectors in terms of corruption with problems like illegal logging and 
long periods to obtain environmental permits (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 
2016).  
 This situation of corruption along with the interest of expanding 
mining investment and hydrocarbon sector motivated the government to 
adhere to the EITI. In this way, Honduras would demonstrate its compromise 
to be transparent with the purpose to obtain foreign direct investment. Hence, 
the government committed publicly in 2012 to the EITI. In order to 
accomplish with the requirements of the EITI, Honduras also received 
international support by the Multi-donor Trust Fund (FFMD), which budget 
was managed by the World Bank. Thus, with this help, the country could 
obtain the candidature rank in the following year, 2013 (Figure 18). Since the 
commitment year, Honduras has presented three reports, disclosing  
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information about payments and its due conciliations of the mining companies 
together with the reports of the central and local governments. With the 
progress of the process, more companies, even small, are included in the 
reports. For example, in the first report, six metallic mining companies were 
reporting, adding up to seven in the second one.  In the reports, there have 
been flaws related to aspects of the work plan, the payments to subnational 
bodies, and public debates, so these limitations have deterred the country to 
become a ‘compliant’ member as we can see in the next graphs (EITI 
Honduras 2013).  
Figure 16 
Control of Corruption Index of Honduras and Adjusted P-Values 
  
Source: Author’s estimation  
Figure 17 
Regime Corruption Index of Honduras and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 




Public Sector Corruption Index of Honduras and Adjusted P-Values 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation  
 
Given the situation of Honduras and after performing the SCM, the 
results suggest that the treated Honduras has not changed in relation to the 
synthetic one. In our period of study 2002 – 2017, the corruption trajectory of 
the three indicators keep steady. Figure 18, pertaining to the Control of Corruption 
Index, shows that after the EITI intervention there is a slight deviation of 0.2 
index points (average annual change for years 2012 and 2013) higher than the 
synthetic unit for the periods of commitment and candidature. 
Notwithstanding, according to the ANRDS method, the informative statistics 
indicate no statistical significance in any of these changes. The same results are 
appreciated for the Public Sector Corruption Index (Figure 20), which index rises by 
0.02 compared to the dotted line of the synthetic unit after the intervention, 
but also non-statistically significant. Contrary to these two indicators, for the 
Regime Corruption Index (Figure 19) the intervened Honduras deviates from the 
synthetic Honduras in the year of commitment by - 0.07 points (i.e. decrease in 
corruption), non-statistically significant for the ANRDS. However, this 
particular measure is statistically significant in the NRDS and the RS(2) 
inference methods, at 10% and 5 % confidence interval respectively. These 
informative p-values would imply that the campaign implemented to spread 
the inclusion of the EITI in the country would have had to some extent an 
effect in public opinion about corruption. In general, since the extractive sector 
in Honduras is very small, the scheme would not have any effect on the 
corruption perception indices. This because corruption indicators encompass 
the perception of corruption in every sector, not a specific one.  
